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[L]aws will not eliminate prejudice from the hearts of human beings. But this
is no reason to allow prejudice to continue to be enshrined in our laws to per-
petuate injustice through inaction. 1
Roper: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of the law.
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get
after the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that.
More: Oh? And when the last law was down-and the Devil turned round on
you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?
2
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1. My SouL LooKs BAcK, 'LEss I FORGET 233 (Dorothy Winbush Riley ed.,
1991)(quoting SHm CHISHOLU, UNBOUGHT AND UNBOssED (1970)).
2. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONs 56 (1960)(stage directions omit-
ted)(recounting the famous dialogue of St. Thomas More).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal and social issues that have emerged out of the doctrine
that people in America have a right against unreasonable government
instituted searches and seizures 3 have dominated the dialogue and
controversy in the American criminal justice system over the last
three decades. 4 A large portion of the debate has centered around the
controversial exclusionary rule,5 which frees the sometimes unmistak-
ably guilty because of irregularities in police procedure. 6
3. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
For an extensive historical examination of the Fourth Amendment see NEI_
SON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937)(discussing the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment and its early constitutional jurisprudence).
The Fourth Amendment embodies what has popularly become known as the
"right to be let alone," particularly by government officials. That right has been
described as "perhaps the most personal of all legal principles. It is also one of
the newest, since only more sophisticated of societies have the interest and the
ability to nurture the subtle and most personal possession of man, his dignity."
MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 1
(1962).
The focus on such a sophisticated right is consistent with United States con-
stitutional history at the time of the American Revolution, at least for those par-
ticipants who were not operating under the limitations of racial oppression or
slavery. "Americans knew they were probably freer and less burdened with cum-
bersome feudal and hierarchical restraints than any part of mankind in the
eighteenth century." GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC 1776-1787, at 3 (1969).
4. When the Supreme Court embarked on the task of applying the Fourth Amend-
ment to the states thirty years ago, it "catapulted" the search and seizure contro-
versy into a position at the core of the Supreme Court debate on criminal justice.
See Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure, in 1 THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
29, 47 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1972).
5. The exclusionary rule is the judicially created doctrine that prevents evidence
that has been obtained in violation of the Constitution from being admitted into
evidence. It often has been criticized by leading conservatives because it "bars
probative evidence that the police are judged, often on the sheerest technicality,
to have obtained improperly." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TowARDS GOMORRAH:
MODERN LIBERALISMAND AMERICAN DECLINE 104 (1996).
6. Repealing the so-called "exclusionary rule" would not make the police
any more effective in their "war" against crime. Despite loud and fre-
quent complaints, the police have not been handcuffed by the rulings of
the Warren Court. Except for minor drug offenses, there is no evidence
to suggest that policemen make fewer arrests, or that prosecutors secure
fewer convictions, because of the Supreme Court decisions safeguarding




The notion that society suffers when criminals go free because of
the constable's blunder has struck a decidedly political note in the dis-
cussion over criminal justice reform.7 Many observers are quick to
note that the protections of a free society are to benefit the law abiding
as well as the criminal.8 Yet others point out that the offender should
not be able to behave lawlessly at the expense of others and with the
assistance of the law. On the other side of the issue is the painful
reality that the power asserted over citizens has often been exercised
and abused on racial, 9 ethniclO and economic" terms.
CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIAiNAL JUSTICE 201 (1978) (foot-
note omitted).
7. The oft quoted question of "whether the criminal is to go free because the consta-
ble had blundered" was first formulated by the legendary Benjamin Cardozo
while he was a judge on the New York Court of Appeals in an opinion rejecting
the application of the exclusionary rule to that State. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y.
13, 19-25 (1926).
8. The media often tells citizens that courts are reacting to police violations of"legal
technicalities" when they overturn criminal defendants' convictions. However, as
one commentator has observed:
The rules, or "legal technicalities," as they are sometimes called by per-
sons disgusted with a particular outcome, are not devised solely with an
eye to ascertaining guilt or punishing the guilty; that could be done expe-
ditiously with the thumbscrew and very efficiently and inexpensively in
our pharmacological age with one sort of drug or another.... The reason
for this is not hard to find. The forms of due process may protect the
criminal, but, more importantly, they also protect the innocent.
WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 185 (1987).
9. One insightful observer asserted that "[a]ny honest chronicler of American legal
history must acknowledge that the legal system in its treatment of blacks has
been characterized by inequality." Lois G. FoRER, CRIINALS AND VICTIMS: A
TRIAL JUDGE REFLECTS ON CaInE AND PuNisHMENT 226 (1980). Another critic of
the inequality in the criminal justice system has surmised that "[t]he racial di-
vide is attributable, at bottom, to the criminal justice system's pervasive reliance
on double standards. While criminal justice is explicitly based on the promise of
equality before the law, the administration of criminal law - from the officer on
the beat to state legislators to the Supreme Court - is in fact predicated on the
exploitation of inequality." David Cole, Race, Policing, and the Future of the
Criminal Law, 26 Humt RIGHTS 2 (1999).
10. In the annals of the administration of justice are many cases of im-
proper treatment of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Spanish-American and
other minority groups. There is widespread belief that blacks, particu-
larly, are frequently subjected to illegal arrest, arrest on weak suspicion,
illegal detention and corporal handling by the police. Compared to
whites, they are jailed more than bailed.
Marvin E. Wolfgang & Bernard Cohen, Crime and Race, in RACIAL DIscRMINA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 284, 287 (Thomas F. Pettigrew ed., 1975).
11. Ironically, minorities and the poor are still overwhelmingly the victims of crime
and poverty. Some scholars have reminded us that problems of crime are "closely
intertwined with issues of discrimination." See Peter E. Edelman, Toward a
Comprehensive Anti-poverty Strategy: Getting Beyond The Silver Bullet, 81 GEO.
L.J. 1697, 1698 (1993).
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In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has entered this
debate with its search and seizure decisions that make a dramatic
turn in favor of police discretion' 2 and away from the more liberal le-
anings it favored during the Warren Court years.1 3 While some of
these decisions involve the traditional police street and vehicle en-
counter,14 many have expanded the rules for employee drug testing15
12. It would be unreasonable to believe that police would not feel at least somewhat
constrained by decisions which place additional obligations on their law enforce-
ment goals.
The police are organized around a dominant organizational goal of ap-
prehending wrongdoers and stopping crime. The court, in handing down
such rulings ... represents an attempt by an outside agency to intrude a
value-fair play to the "criminal"-that is almost impossible to reconcile
with the organization's dominant goal: "collaring" wrongdoers.
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPO-
RATE BEHAVIOR 242 n.* (1975).
13. Very early in the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren the Supreme Court was
criticized for attempting to impose more control over local law enforcement. "The
Conference of State Chief Justices in 1958 went so far as to pass a resolution
condemning the Warren Court for its erosion of federalism and its tendency 'to
adopt the role of policymaker without proper judicial restraint.'" DAVID M.
O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 306-07
(1986).
14. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)(permitting broad latitude in the
stopping of a vehicle and the detecting of occupants).
In its brief, the State of Maryland argued that police safety justified the impo-
sition on passengers:
If anything, the danger inherent in roadside encounters increases when
passengers are present. Like drivers, passengers have access to weap-
ons that may be inside the passenger area of a car. Thus, ordering the
driver alone to exit does not erase the danger. Moreover, a passenger
might well act in concert with the driver or other passengers to ambush
the officer, or act alone to do so while the officer is dealing with the
driver. The dangers that attend any traffic stop multiply with each addi-
tional occupant.
Permitting officers as a matter of routine to control the movements of
all occupants in a vehicle lawfully stopped for a traffic violation is the
only efficacious means of addressing the concern for officer safety. It is
simply impracticable to require the officer to have particularized suspi-
cion of danger before acting to protect himself. By the time the officer
detects the threat, the passenger may already have secured a tactical
advantage. Indeed, the officer could be wounded or killed before any
sign of danger presents itself.
Brief for Petitioner at 18-19, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)(No. 95-
1268) (footnote omitted).
15. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)(validating drug testing
in a high school, even without suspicion).
Under a discretionary random testing policy, management is vested with
unfettered discretion to require employees to submit to a drug test at
any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. Labor unions
and civil rights organizations have reserved their most vocal vitriolic
criticism for such policies. One federal district court described such test-
ing as "draconian" and an "invasion[ ] of privacy ... almost unheard of in
[Vol. 79:711
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and high technology surveillance,16 as well as those that assist the
police in forfeiting the assets of citizens suspected of criminal activ-
ity.17 Nothing in these recent opinions indicates the possibility of a
return to the broader, more protective search and seizure doctrines
that characterized the defendant friendly doctrines of the Warren
Court.is
During its most recent terms, the Supreme Court has taken a par-
ticularly acute right turn in its search and seizure jurisprudence,J9
which has left many scholars wondering whether the Constitution of-
fers any protection at all.20 The Court's opinions raise concerns that
the once well regarded freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
has become a wasteland without even an occasional oasis of judicial
protection.
a free society" in the course of issuing a temporary retraining order
blocking the implementation of a random testing policy.
ROBERT P. DEcREcSCE ET AL., DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 136 (1989)(quoting
IBEW Local Union No. 1900 v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3071, 3072 (D.D.C. 1986)); see Murray v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 122 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2057 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
16. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)(approving high tech police
observation of a residence from an airplane under the plain view doctrine).
For a detailed discussion of the scope and application of the plain view doc-
trine, see Howard E. Wallin, The Uncertain Scope of the Plain View Doctrine, 16
U. BALT. L. REV. 266, 267-68 (1987)(stating that the plain view doctrine "does not
in and of itself justify the intrusion").
17. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996)(upholding forfeiture of an automo-
bile that was the site of an act of prostitution against a claim by the client's wife).
18. Although Chief Justice Earl Warren and the Court he led received criticism for
eroding police authority in the search and seizure area, Warren himself did not
operate without respect for the need for effective law enforcement. Indeed, one
account of the Supreme Court conference of the famous case Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), indicates his great concern for the safety of police in the field. See
BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHEN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 258-60
(1983). This account notes that Warren wrote a draft opinion in which he stated
that the policeman "was entitled to take reasonable measures to protect himself.
... A police officer is not required to sacrifice his life on the altar of a doctrinaire
judicial scholasticism which ignores the deadly realities of criminal investigation
and law enforcement." Id. at 259. After some suggestions from other Justices,
Warren was finally offered and accepted a substitute draft written by Justice
William Brennan "which omitted much of the Chiefs pro-police rhetoric." Id. at
260.
19. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)(holding that when police stop a
driver and decide to release him, they need not inform him that he has a right to
leave before requesting consent to conduct a search of his vehicle).
20. See David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway,
66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 556, 557 (1998)(discussing the Supreme Court's visible
trend for the last two decades of "steadily increasing police power and discretion
over cars and their occupants" and stating that "the Court has conferred upon the




This Article is an attempt to offer a meaningful look at the current
state of search and seizure principles being applied (or not being ap-
plied) by the Supreme Court.2 1 It also will attempt to offer some solu-
tions to the primary problem of search and seizure law - the absence
of protection from abuse of police discretion,22 particularly during the
situation in which the police allegedly obtain consent to search sus-
pects. While police must have some measure of discretion,2 3 they
must also behave reasonably and honestly in the execution of their
duties.24 The current judicial retreat from the imposition of specific
rules of conduct on police has left a void in privacy protection and
presents the opportunity for search and seizure overreaching.2 5
The Supreme Court has made clear that it no longer will be in the
business of fashioning search and seizure "codes" 26 for the police of-
21. See id. One Supreme Court observer has noted that the addition of conservative
justices to the Court during the mid 1990s has moved the Court to re-examine
"1l]ong-held assumptions about the authority of the federal government, the rela-
tionship between Washington and the states .... " Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to
the Old Order in the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, § 4, at 1.
22. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAw: POLICE AND
THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993)(discussing in detail the use of force and the
control of police discretion).
23. Clearly, without some measure of discretion police may be subject to physical
harm. I do not suggest that all Supreme Court decisions demand second-guess-
ing of police, particularly when it may involve their own safety or the safety of
others. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1991)(holding that asking a
man suspected of having a gun where the gun is located is not a violation of the
Fifth Amendment because of the danger to public safety).
24. Some scholars have examined the due process model of criminal rights and have
concluded that since "power is open to abuse and fact-finding is inherently error-
prone, proponents of the due process model argue that constraints ought to be
placed on the discretion exercised by officials of the state." JAIAES M. INVERARirY
ET AL., LAW AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL LAW 247
(1983).
25. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 6 (1995)(re-
counting police abuses in search and seizure including the policy of the Chicago
police "to take people to the lockup for even trivial traffic violations" and to per-
form strip searches for minor traffic offenses).
26. The Supreme Court has recently demonstrated its unwillingness to impose con-
crete standards on police in order to control their almost limitless discretion to
stop vehicles. For example, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the
Supreme Court held that pretextual traffic stops were reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, even where an officer follows an individual he wants to arbi-
trarily stop until the driver violates "any one of the innumerable, often inane,
traffic code sections that exist in all jurisdictions." See Sean Hecker, Race and
Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Boards, 28
COLum. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 554 (1997)(describing the decision in Whren as
"myopic in its understatement of the danger that pretext stops pose to the goal of
nondiscriminatory, and hence legitimate, law enforcement").
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ficer in the field except in the most general terms.2 7 Some scholars
have gone so far as to consider much of the Fourth Amendment to be
"dead letter"28 due to the exceptions 29 and modifications that have
eroded the host of Warren Court decisions.3 0 The rise of a strong law
and order movement 3 ' and a host of conservative appointments to the
Supreme Court32 have made expansion of search and seizure protec-
tion unlikely.
In this Article, I propose a legislative solution that will balance the
need for controlled discretion in search and seizure situations with the
desire for a high level of accountability for police officers on the street
and those responsible for policy, supervision, and the training of street
level officers.3 3 In the pursuit of reaching a consensus on the proper
balance between personal freedom and crime control, particularly
where racial bias might be alleged,3 4 a useful starting point is to ad-
just the burden of proof3 5 in certain types of search cases and to re-
quire police departments to keep records of police-citizen encounters.
27. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)(requiring courts to inquire into
whether the police action was in fact a seizure before determining whether there
was a Fourth Amendment violation).
28. See Harris, supra note 20.
29. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)(establishing good faith exception
to the probable cause requirement for police who have obtained a warrant).
30. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
31. Even Chief Justice Warren recognized the "law and order" backlash against his
criminal justice jurisprudence. He wrote:
Because the court, over the years, sought to make our criminal proce-
dures conform to the relevant provisions of the Constitution and be a
reality for the poor as well as the rich, it was made the target for wide-
spread abuse .... Because police and indignant citizens were over-
whelmed with the wave of violence that flooded the land, they found in
the Court a stationary target and made us responsible for the increasing
crime rate. We were "soft on criminals," they said.
EARL WARREN, THE EmoIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 316 (1977).
32. The appointments of Justice Anthony Kennedy by Republican President Ronald
Reagan on February 11, 1988, and Justice Clarence Thomas by Republican Presi-
dent George Bush on October 16, 1991, tilted the balance of the Court to a solid
conservative majority.
33. "Police officers require extensive training in the use of force, as well as the ability
to implement non-violent, problem-solving skills. These are critical to the opti-
mum functioning of police officers in the communities they serve." JOHN L. BuR-
RIs & CATHERINE WHITNEY, BLUE vs. BLACm LET'S END THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
Cops AND MINORITIES 215 (1999).
34. Racial problems that occur between citizens and police are often difficult to prove.
As the Supreme Court recently observed in an opinion by Justice Clarence
Thomas, "[olutright admission of impermissible racial motivation are infrequent
and plaintiffs often must rely upon other evidence." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541, 553 (1999)(involving a suit that challenged a voter redistricting plan that
was allegedly drawn in a racially motivated manner in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause).
35. Various standards of proof are used in the law. In the trial of criminal
cases ... it is a requirement of due process that the defendant be proven
20001
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More "structural accountability"36 is needed to operate as a check
on broad police discretion and to allow the police to reasonably predict
how the courts will review their behavior when they conduct
searches.37 We will begin to strike the appropriate balance between
citizens and law enforcement only by removing the focus from the
courts, returning to the privacy expectations of citizens, and demand-
ing more local review.38 More accountability is particularly needed to
reduce the racial discrimination that seems to be a dominant and re-
curring theme in the search and seizure controversy.3 9 If confidence
that the police can conduct themselves fairly and effectively cannot be
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil cases, by contrast, the stan-
dard usually is a preponderance of evidence, commonly defined as proof
which leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact is
more probable than its nonexistence. But in certain circumstances a
standard somewhere between these two is utilized; it is usually called
the clear and convincing evidence standard, and means that the
factfinder must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly
probable."
WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 508 (2d ed. 1992).
"In large measure, the choice of the standard is a matter of local law, but at least
in some circumstances the Constitution may compel use of something beyond the
preponderance standard." Id.
36. Police accountability should be understood as a system of structures that help to
shape the conduct of both individual officers and police departments in order that
they may comply with standards of practice that respect the constitutional rights
of individuals. It has been observed that the user of deadly force in a police de-
partment had more to do with the police chiefs philosophy than with rates of
crime or violence. See Gerald Uelman, Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police
Policy Regarding the Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 Loy. LP. L.
REv. 1, 15 (1973).
37. The job of a police officer is to provide public safety and to restrain persons who
are a threat to public safety. These tasks are unpleasant, but they are necessary
for a civil society. See generally James Q. Wilson, Police and Their Problems: A
Theory, in PUBLIC POLICY: YEARBOOK OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMIN-
ISTRATION, HARVARD UNwERSITY 189, 220-21 (Carl J. Friedrich & Semour E. Har-
ris eds., 1963).
38. Writer James Baldwin has vividly described the often volatile relationship be-
tween police and citizens, particularly in ethnic communities:
[Tihe only way to police a ghetto is to be oppressive. None of the Police
Commissioner's men, even with the best will in the world, have any way
of understanding the lives led by the people they swaggered about in
twos and threes controlling. Their very presence is an insult ....
... He moves through Harlem, therefore, like an occupying soldier in
a bitterly hostile country ....
JAMES BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME 65-66 (1962).
39. Discrimination is often based on stereotyping. One insightful observer has ex-
plained that "[flor better or worse, stereotypes creep into every aspect of our lives.
They stem from our desire to simplify a world made up of a diverse sea of human
faces .... Our complicated, often chaotic world becomes a more orderly place
when we tag whole groups of people with common characteristics based on skin
color, ethnicity, age, [or] gender." M. Dion Thompson, Trying to Move Past Ste-
reotypes, BALT. SUN, Jan. 16, 2000, at 1C.
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restored in urban communities where crime is most severe, our objec-
tive of a free society will not be meaningfully realized.40
In recent years, the Supreme Court has cut down the trees planted
by the Warren Court that were designed to protect criminal suspects
from unfair police practices. Subsequent, more conservative Courts
have largely ignored the doctrines protecting search and seizure, mak-
ing that body of jurisprudence a constitutional wasteland.
II. RIGHT WITHOUT REMEDY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY
PROBLEM AND THE FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF
WOLF v. COLORADO
Most discussions of the Fourth Amendment focus on the Warren
Court and its 1960s jurisprudence as a starting point for assessing the
current state of search and seizure law.4 ' However, I believe a proper
perspective can only be obtained by reaching back at least to the pre-
Warren Court era of the late 1940s.4 2
Fifty years ago, abortions were still illegal in many states and Dr.
Julius Wolf of Colorado stood accused of performing them. Wolf v. Col-
40. Huge amounts of financial resources have been committed to crime control, pri-
marily drug related crime in major cities. See John A. Powell & Eileen B. Her-
shenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the
Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 557 (1991).
41. Consistency has rarely been a virtue of the Supreme Court, and
under Warren its record in this regard was no worse than in the past.
The question of consistency, or, rather, the lack of it, does point to a fact
about the Warren Court that is often obscured by stressing its affirma-
tions of Bill of Rights freedoms. On balance, liberal activism character-
ized the work of the Court during its sixteen years under Warren; but
there were many decisions that libertarians deplored as encroachments
on constitutionally protected freedoms.
Leonard W. Levy, Introduction, in THE SUPREM COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 17
(Leonard W. Levy ed., 1972).
If courts try to be faithful to the text of the Constitution, they will for
that very reason be forced to decide between competing conceptions of
political morality. So it is wrong to attack the Warren Court, for exam-
ple, on the ground that it failed to treat the Constitution as a binding
text. On the contrary, if we wish to treat fidelity to that text as an over-
riding requirement of constitutional interpretation, then it is the con-
servative critics of the Warren Court who are a fault, because their
philosophy ignores the direction to face issues of moral principle that the
logic of the text demands.
RONALD DwoRKmN, TAING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 136 (1978).
42. Prior to the 1940s, civil rights groups complained about the problem of police
abuse. "In 1939 and 1940 NAACP lawyers persuaded the Supreme Court to re-
verse three convictions on the ground that confessions had been coerced. The
cases involved confessions that had been produced by severe beatings extending
over several days." MARK V. TusHNET, MAKING CrvL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPRErm COURT, 1936-1961, at 50 (1994). This litigation was
the catalyst for examination of other police misconduct issues.
2000]
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orado,43 decided by the Supreme Court on June 27, 1949, opened a
legal debate about what the legal system should do when law enforce-
ment violates the Fourth Amendment. The main question in that de-
bate was whether prosecutors should be permitted to use illegally
seized evidence in court.44
The Denver police suspected Dr. Wolf, who was an obstetrician, of
performing abortions.45 Without any warrants, representatives of the
District Attorney went to Dr. Wolf's office, took him into custody and
searched his office.46 During the search, they seized his daybooks,
which recorded the patients who consulted him.47 From this informa-
tion the prosecutor obtained leads, questioned former patients, and
was able to build his case.48 Dr. Wolf appealed to the United States
Supreme Court claiming that the patient information taken from his
office should not have been used against him because state officials
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.49
While Wolf is not as well known as other Supreme Court cases, its
central issue has been the touchstone of a debate around the so called
"exclusionary rule,"50 which prevents a prosecutor from using illegally
seized evidence. By 1914, the Supreme Court had ruled that such evi-
dence could not be used in federal court trials.5' By the time the Su-
preme Court heard the Wolf case, however, there was a difference of
opinion among the states as to whether the rule excluding evidence
applied to state trials.52
In a 6-3 opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter reasoned that the Con-
stitution did not necessarily require the exclusion of the evidence from
43. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
44. Put differently, should a court reward police officers acting in "open defiance of
the prohibitions of the Constitution?" Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394
(1914).
45. See T.S.L. Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HARv. L.
REv. 1304, 1304 (1951).




50. The rule had grown out of two theories: first, that the only way to deter
police from violating the Fourth Amendment's protection against "unrea-
sonable searches" was to prohibit the use in prosecution of whatever
they had illegally obtained; second, that evidence obtained illegally
would taint a trial and make the courts partners in lawless police
conduct.
BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARmsTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 113-14 (1979).
51. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)(stating that in federal trials, the
Fourth Amendment bars the use of evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal
officers).
52. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 34.
[Vol. 79:711
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Wolfs trial5 3 even though the Fourth Amendment was a fundamental
right that applied to the states, and even though Dr. Wolf's rights
were therefore violated.5 4 Justice Frankfurter suggested that civil
lawsuits and "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an
alert public opinion,"5 5 were enough to deter police from illegal
searches. In short, the Court ruled that Dr. Wolfs rights were vio-
lated but the police could still use the evidence obtained to convict
him.56 The dissenting Justices took issue with that result, fearing
that without excluding the evidence, there was effectively no sanction
at all against police who had clearly violated the law.57
Dissenting Justice Murphy, who was critical of Justice Frank-
furter's belief, wrote that "[s]elf scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exalta-
tion reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney to prosecute
himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and
seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates
have ordered."58 In a similar vein, an article published in the
Harvard Law Review5 9 shortly after the Wolf case noted that the Su-
preme Court had performed the "unprecedented[ I] feat of simultane-
ously creating a constitutional right and denying the most effective
remedy for violation of that right."60
The "exclusionary rule" was not fully applied to a state official un-
til 1961 when a more liberal Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren 6 l
decided the case of Mapp v. Ohio.62 However, the battle over the
53. See id. at 29.
54. See id. at 30.
55. Id. at 31.
56. See Wayne R. LaFave, Mapp Revisited: Shakespeare, J., and Other Fourth
Amendment Poets, 47 STAN. L. REv. 261, 265 (1995)(stating that the exclusion of
evidence removes the incentive to disregard the Fourth Amendment).
57. See generally Fred Gilbert Bennett, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An
Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 UCLA L. REV.
1129 (1973)(discussing the justifications for the exclusionary rule and arguing for
its expansion).
58. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
59. See Perlman, supra note 45.
60. Id. at 1304.
61. One professor has said that
[e]minent scholars from many fields have commented upon [the Warren
Court's] tendency towards over-generalization, the disrespect for prece-
dent, even those of recent vintage, the needless obscurity of opinions, the
discouraging lack of candor, the disdain for the fact finding of the lower
courts, the tortured reading of statutes, and the seeming absence of neu-
trality and objectivity.
Milton Handler, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws: A Critic's View
Point, 1 GA. L. REv. 339, 350 (1967).
62. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The change in policy reflected in the Mapp decision, which
overruled Wolf, was a direct result of a change in vote by Justice Hugo Black from
his earlier position on the exclusionary rule. No constitutional issue highlighted
the antagonism between Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black more than the
2000]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Fourth Amendment did not end with the Mapp decision. Even though
the Supreme Court continued to strengthen the Fourth Amendment
until the late 1970s,6 3 the appointment of Warren Burger as Chief
Justice,64 and other conservative appointments thereafter,6 5 marked
the beginning of a dramatic conservative turn in the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment. Their battles led to further destabilizations of the Court's
exclusionary rule direction. One scholar described their stalemate in this way:
Black had effectively exposed the weakness in Frankfurter's "natural
law" approach that relied on the Justices' sense of fairness and decency.
In later cases Frankfurter would decide whether police conduct violated
the Fourteenth Amendment if it "shocked the conscience." Whose con-
science? asked Hugo Black. But Frankfurter would counter that Black's
theory that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated all of the Bill of
Rights and made them applicable to the states, in addition to being his-
torically flawed, delivered an awesome amount of power to the Justices
.... At the same time, Frankfurter's opposition to the incorporation
theory was seen as further evidence of his anti-libertarian sympathies.
JAMEs F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 179 (1989).
Another scholar describes the conflict between Frankfurter and Black in this
way:
Repelled by the old "laissez-faire" abuse, Mr. Justice Black tries to purify
and stabilize the law by clear, categorical rules. The purpose, plainly, is
to minimize judicial discretion, provide a high degree of predictability as
to the outcome of litigation, and leave basic policy changes to the demo-
cratic processes. But to curb judicial discretion is to curb its potential for
good as well as for evil. Hence the wooden rules and their author's un-
willingness to follow them. The Justice has not found a way to limit the
discretion of other judges without limiting himself. Rejecting orthodox
precepts and finding his own substitutes inadequate, he is left in diffi-
cult cases with little but ad hoc grounds for decision. In this impasse he
is guided apparently by his own benevolent ideals - just as some of the
"nine old men" were guided evidently by their more spartan principles.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter avoids this embarrassment. For him discre-
tion is inevitable in constitutional decisions, because the basic law is
necessarily imprecise.
WALLACE MENDELSON, JUSTICEs BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE
COURT 73 (1961).
63. The concept ofjudges denying police access to seized evidence reflects our general
suspicion that police cannot police themselves entirely. "[H]aving judges decide
what police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment reflects a distrust of soci-
ety's ability or willingness to apply the Fourth Amendment properly." George C.
Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal View of
the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147, 149 (1993).
64. Warren Burger was nominated Chief Justice in May 1969 and confirmed by the
Senate on June 9, 1969.
65. One commentator has observed that Chief Justice Rehnquist's rather conserva-
tive voting record helped to change the position of the court from the days of the
Warren Court. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the
Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73
JUDICATURE 103, 106 tbl.4 (1989)(noting that Justice Rehnquist took civil liberta-
rian positions only 19.6% of the time as compared with 77.2% for Justice
Brennan).
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search and seizure jurisprudence. 66 In a host of cases decided over the
66. In the midst of the Supreme Court's debate over the exclusionary rule, President
Ronald Reagan's Task Force on Victims of Crime published its final report. See
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMIS OF CRIME, FiNAL REPORT 24-28 (1982). It
included the following lengthy and scathing critique of the doctrine:
Executive and Legislative Recommendation 5: Legislation should be
proposed and enacted to abolish the exclusionary rule as it applies to
Fourth Amendment issues.
... Anyone evaluating the exclusionary rule must constantly keep
this basic premise in mind. The framers of the Constitution did not cre-
ate the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment. They
could have done so. They did in the Fifth Amendment, which clearly
provides that information forcefully taken from a suspect cannot be used
against him. This constitutional adoption of the exclusionary principle
was specifically not relied upon in setting out the Fourth Amendment.
The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created rule of procedure
that fails to serve the goals it seeks, and fails at a tremendous cost.
Great emotion is generated in any discussion of the rule because its
proponents treat the rule itself with the same sanctity as the rights it
purports to protect. Unlawful government intrusion is like disease; no
one is in favor of it. It must be remembered that the exclusionary rule is
a remedy only, and not a very good one. It thus rewards the criminal
and punishes, not the police, but the innocent victim of the crime and
society at large for conduct they may not condone and over which they
have little or no control.
Courts have created an incredibly complex body of Fourth Amend-
ment law. Cases turn on minute factual distinctions, and courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, will frequently disagree on what the
requirements actually are. Indeed, judges within the same court often
disagree. This intricate, extensive, and ever-changing set of rules must
be digested and applied by a police officer, who is not a lawyer, and who
must decide in the confusion and danger of the moment if he can detain
a suspect, look into his car, or pat-search him for weapons in an attempt
to avoid being shot.
The situation has been likened to an inverted pyramid. At the
broadest part is the Supreme Court, which often takes months to ana-
lyze the problem and even then the justices may not agree. Before the
case arrives at that level a court of appeals will have considered it for
weeks or months. Before that, lawyers will have spent days or weeks
marshalling arguments and writing briefs for preliminary hearing and
trial court judges. In the course of this scrutiny, each reviewer looks
with calm contemplation over the shoulder of the officer in the field, who,
at the point of the pyramid, is expected to make the right decision
instantly.
The judicial system purports to be based on the truth. A trial is de-
fined as a search for the truth; and by relying on the truth, it is said,
justice will be found. However, the exclusionary rule results in lies. Evi-
dence that has been seized and is highly probative of the defendant's
guilt is excluded. From that point on everyone must pretend that it does
not exist ....
Not only does the exclusionary rule benefit the guilty while failing to
protect the innocent, the existence and operation of the rule has a disa-
bling effect on the entire justice system. It is sometimes argued that the
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last twenty years, the Court has not only created a multitude of excep-
tions to the Fourth Amendment, which have limited the definition of
what constitutes a search,6 7 but has also made a court's consideration
of the intentions6 8 of even aggressive police officers in performing
searches more difficult,69 which has limited the circumstances in
which the exclusionary rule can apply. The exclusionary rule battle-
ground has resulted in a lack of clarity in the application of what
would otherwise be the plain meaning of the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement 7 0 and reasonableness provisions. 7 ' Conse-
quently, justifying a search, particularly one conducted without a war-
rant, should be the government's burden.7 2
The lingering question that remains from the Wolf case is whether
citizens will more closely scrutinize police searches or whether police
will continue to enjoy greater flexibility from the Supreme Court in
their pursuit of crime. The issue is particularly important at the local
level since ninety-five percent of all crimes are prosecuted in state
courts.7 3 Since today's Supreme Court is clearly becoming less inter-
rule can be tolerated because motions to suppress are granted in only a
small proportion of cases. Such an analysis attempts to reveal the size of
the iceberg by measuring its tip. However, even when suppression mo-
tions are not granted, the provision for them hobbles honest and effec-
tive law enforcement at every step and imposes an enormous burden on
an already overtaxed system.
The Task Force has concluded that the exclusionary rule does not
work, severely compromises the truth-finding process, imposes an intol-
erable burden on the system, and prevents the court from doing justice.
Accordingly, we recommend that the exclusionary rule as it applies to
Fourth Amendment issues be abolished.
Id. at 24-28.
67. See California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
68. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
69. See supra note 8.
70. The Fourth Amendment requires that searches be based on probable cause and a
warrant. Thus, warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.
71. The Fourth Amendment contains a reasonableness clause that assumes that all
searches should be conducted in a manner consistent with the goals of the
Constitution.
72. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
73. See JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAw 19 (1998). This recently released American Bar Association study
examined the frequency of federal prosecutions to reach some conclusions about
the impact on the prosecution of local crimes.
To assess the extent to which federalization of criminal law has the
potential to impact crime in general and local crime in particular, the
Task Force first examined available data to assess the comparative fre-
quency of federal and state prosecutions. The key point is that federal
prosecutions comprise less than 5% of all the prosecutions in the nation.
The other 95% are state and local prosecutions.
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ested in monitoring local police 74 - a position similar to that em-
braced by the Wolf majority opinion fifty years ago - citizens will
have to take more of an interest in police conduct if they intend to curb
potential discrimination and abuse.7 5 If police are to be more account-
able to the public they serve, legislation at both the federal and state
level will be required. 76 As far as the exclusionary rule is concerned,
we may be no closer to resolving the controversy of whether the rule is
a good idea than we were when Dr. Wolfs office was illegally searched
over five decades ago. 7 7
That the guilty occasionally benefit because of the constable's blun-
der7 8 is an uncomfortable cost that may have to remain a fixture in
our law in order to protect liberty. This is particularly so since there
may be no other effective alternative that will discourage illegal police
conduct.79 Ironically, Dr. Wolf would not even be the subject of a
criminal prosecution today because of the now constitutionally pro-
tected woman's right to choose,8 0 a fact that reminds us that the sands
74. See generally Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court: Has
the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273 (1987)(discussing Justice Rehnquist's
views and the effect he will have on the Court).
75. See New York Civil Liberties Union, NYCLU Special Report, Five Years of Civil-
ian Review: A Mandate Unfulfilled July 5, 1993-July 5, 1998, at <http.//www.
nyclu.orgfiveyears.html>, [hereinafter NYCLU]("A weak civilian review agency
emboldens police officers with a propensity to abuse their power, and gives false
assurance to civilians who file a complaint of police misconduct with the expecta-
tion justice will be done.").
76. See id.
77. Perhaps part of the problem with reaching firm conclusions about the validity of
the exclusionary rule lies in the almost schizophrenic policy consideration that
the criminal procedure rule produces. On the one hand, the guilty go unpun-
ished, which has always been considered repugnant to those who think justice
should be consistent with respect to punitive consequences. On the other hand, a
fundamental part of our justice system is to attempt to create accountability so
that the police are encouraged to follow the rules that reflect the fundamental
values of our society. As Professor Peter Arnella explains:
One can take American criminal procedure's protection of fair process
norms at face value as an ethical prerequisite of a just legal system that
places some substantive and procedural restraints on the state's exercise
of power. Or, one can explain this legitimation function from an instru-
mentalist perspective. To perform its dispute-resolution function effec-
tively, American criminal procedure must provide a mechanism that
settles the conflict in a manner that induces community respect for the
fairness of its processes as well as the reliability of its outcomes. From
this instrumentalist perspective, the most important consideration is
how the process appears to the community.
Peter Arnella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 202 (1983).
78. See supra note 8.
79. See generally Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alter-
native to Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HAsn Ns CoNsT. L.Q.
45 (1987)(discussing alternatives to the exclusionary rule).
80. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of law are always shifting. Perhaps another important idea that
emerges from our fifty-year odyssey with the exclusionary rule contro-
versy is that, like it or not, freedom is rarely free.S1 The attempts by
post-Warren Courts to undermine the scope of the exclusionary rule
have diminished protection against unreasonable search and seizure
and in many instances have made the Fourth Amendment as mean-
ingless as it was when Wolf was decided.
III. STRUCTURAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
UNDERVALUED DOCTRINE OF
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
It would be no stretch of legal analysis to state that Miranda v.
Arizona8 2 is the most controversial criminal procedure case ever de-
cided by the Supreme Court. It was the grist for both legal scholars
and politicians from the moment it was decided. It has become an icon
of popular culture, with its familiar warnings more recognizable to the
average citizen than Shakespeare's poetry.8 3 Recently, however, the
Fourth Circuit directly challenged the legal basis of the decision, but
was rejected by the Supreme Court,84 despite the fact that some com-
81. Judge and scholar Richard Posner has written that "unless the resources devoted
to determining guilt and innocence are increased, the only way to reduce the
probability of convicting the innocent is to reduce the probability of convicting the
guilty as well." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 216
(1990).
82. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although most observers view Miranda as a departure from
accepted legal principles, not all of them agree that it dramatically changed the
legal landscape. Indeed, one observer wrote:
[A]lI the Miranda decision did was assure to the uninformed and the
poor the same rights that reasonably knowledgeable and prosperous citi-
zens had asserted all along. But bitter and persistent attacks-
originated in large measure by policeman and prosecutors who had
failed to do their jobs properly in the first place, and then taken up by
the right wing as a handy weapon to belabor the "Warren Court" with for
a number of its decisions-finally convinced most conservatives and
even many moderates that the Court had done something wildly radical.
RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAw, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA
235 (1970).
83. During the 1960s, television made Miranda legendary. The decision "dismayed
some policemen, embittered some prosecutors, and baffled some judges." KARL
MERRINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 9 (1968). Shortly after the decision was
handed down, actors Jack Webb, of the popular television show Dragnet, and Ben
Alexander addressed a meeting of 500 prosecutors in Denver, Colorado.
"Puffing his Felony Squad show, Alexander said: 'The Supreme Court says we
can't interrogate crooks anymore. So what choice do we have?' His answer: 'We
shoot 'em. On our show the viewers will see the crime committed, so they know
the guy's guilty. That way, nobody gets upset when we shoot him.'" Id. (quoting
TV Solves Miranda, TIME, Aug. 26, 1996, at 79).
84. The Fourth Circuit held that confessions in federal court were not governed by
the Miranda decision, but rather, by a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985),
which provides that such confessions should be reviewed under the pre-Miranda
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mentators believe that the case may be ripe to overrule.8 5 It has con-
tinually been a favorite target of conservative politicians and groups
since it was decided.8 6 Without a doubt, the decision's linkage to the
Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination and explicit exclu-
sionary provision has made it a central battleground in the criminal
procedure debate.8 7 Like its Fourth Amendment cousin, the Fifth
Amendment shares a common history in the founding of this nation.8 8
criteria for voluntariness. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.
1999), overruled by 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). In fashioning this theory, the court
relied heavily on Congress' action to modify the effects of the Miranda decision
shortly after it was announced. "Congress sought to circumscribe [Miranda] in
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by declaring that volun-
tary confessions were admissible in evidence in Federal courts and directing Fed-
eral trial judges to determine voluntariness on the basis of certain statutory
criteria." WILLIAi F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY:
A MODERN INTERPRETATION 200 (1974)(footnotes omitted).
The Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and left the Mi-
randa decision intact. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000)(holding that Miranda's warning based approach could not be overruled by
legislative action).
85. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Hand Cuffing the Cops?: A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1055 (1998).
86. Like many other moderate conservatives in the legal profession in the 1960s,
Powell was publicly critical of the Warren Court's most controversial decisions in
the criminal law field, such as Miranda. "Powell believed that fairness to crimi-
nal defendants could be preserved without broad-based rules that could frustrate
the police and prosecution, as he thought the Court had done with its Miranda
decision." JAIiEs F. SIATON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE
THE REHNQUIST COURT 182 (1995).
87. Miranda was not the first opinion to advance the concept that confessions were
subject to constitutional scrutiny. In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court held that "[iun criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever
a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because [it is] not volun-
tary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment... com-
manding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.'" Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. V). However, the Court did not directly rely on Bram's holding in
subsequent cases. In fact, in early 1951, the Court questioned its validity. See
United States v. Cardigan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951).
By the time the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states by the
Warren Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court had once
again expressly embraced the Brain rule and extended it two years later in
Miranda.
88. The late Justice William 0. Douglas wrote:
[Altihough torture was long used to solve crimes, experience proved that
it was not an honorable way for government to deal with its citizens ....
But the protection of the Fifth Amendment transcends the use of torture
by the police. It outlaws all forms of physical, legal, or moral compulsion
utilized to make a man convict himself.
WILLiAm 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 145 (1958). He reminded us that
"It]hose who would attach a sinister meaning to the invocation of the Fifth
Amendment have forgotten that history." Id. at 146.
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Scholars disagree on whether the Miranda warnings are constitu-
tionally required,S9 but the accountability problems that led the Su-
preme Court to issue its decision cannot be denied. Most people who
can recite the warnings have little appreciation for the remainder of
the extraordinary opinion.90 However, this is where people have un-
dervalued its reasoning and where the opinion's strength in the ac-
countability framework is demonstrated. 91
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the failure to advise the
defendant of his right to an attorney required the exclusion of his con-
fession at his trial.92 In order to understand Miranda's true value,
one must understand its unique contribution to constitutional juris-
prudence. It is essentially a procedure case born out of a problem that
required exceptional accountability measures. In the voluminous
opinion, the Court explained that it was dealing "with the admissibil-
ity of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to cus-
todial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which
assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate
himself."93 The need for the opinion arose out of concerns about vio-
lent police abuse during questioning. Relying on the Wickersham Re-
89. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85.
90. In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), Chief Justice Warren said:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the
law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the
actual criminals themselves.
Id. at 320.
91. The concepts advanced in Miranda were not only known prior to the decision,
they were also practiced by some well-regarded law enforcement agencies. As
Justice William 0. Douglas reminded us, "[tihe cry went up that Miranda made
the police helpless and ineffective. But the FBI had lived under those standards,
and it was probably the most efficient police force in the world." WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 387 (1980).
92. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
93. Id. at 439. One commentator explained that
the [United States] system of justice is based on accusation, not inquisi-
tion. In an accusatory system, a person is innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State must investigate and present evi-
dence to a jury to prove its case even though interrogating and torturing
the suspect would clearly be more efficient. As one nineteenth-century
English legal commentator put it, 'It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably
in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about
in the sun hunting up evidence.'
ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDy, IN OUR DEFENSE: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
ACTION 171 (1991)(quoting SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMI-




port filed with Congress in the 1930s, 9 4 the Court expressed concerns
that police often "resort to physical force to obtain confessions."9 5
The secrecy of the interrogation room and the lack of accountabil-
ity that circumstances created were what made violence possible. The
Court wrote that "[pirivacy results in secrecy and this in turn results
in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interroga-
tion rooms."96 In making its pitch for a procedural solution, the Su-
preme Court urged that "[ulnless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,
no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be a product of his
free choice."97 The Supreme Court expressed its rationale for account-
ability solutions in monitoring law enforcement interrogation prac-
tices9 8 when it stated that "[a]s a practical matter, the compulsion to
speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater
than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery."99 In
order to accomplish its protective goal, the Court reasoned that "un-
94. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-46.
95. Id. at 446 (quoting CoMI~mssIoN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE 17 (1961)).
96. Id. at 448.
97. Id. at 458. Ironically, after Miranda was paroled in 1972, he was arrested again
on drug and weapon charges in 1974. "In early 1976, now 34, he was slain in a
Phoenix, Arizona, skid row bar in a quarrel over a card game." HENRY J. ABRA-
HAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 127 (4th ed. 1982).
Marvin E. Frankel, a former law professor and United States District Court
judge, has questioned the logic of permitting "station house" interrogations at all.
He wrote,
why should a court ever allow self injuring confessions to the cops as
evidence against the defendant.... It is difficult to see why questioning
before a neutral magistrate, with a lawyer present, should not be infi-
nitely preferred to being all alone in the police station answering the
insistent queries of a ring of officers.
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 96, 99 (1980).
98. Confessions are a vital part of effective police work. .[Ciriminal cases that are
litigated represent only a fraction of all case dispositions. Of those disposed of
without full trial, there are many in which there has been a confession[, other-
wise] the prosecutor would frequently not be in a position to bargain effectively
for a guilty plea." KEVIN TIERNEY, COURTROOM TESTIMONY: A POLICEMAN'S GUIDE
196 (1970).
99. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461. Not all criminals embrace their Miranda rights upon
being arrested.
[Tihe largest group of suspects who failed to take advantage of Miranda
rejected it not out of cynicism but because they believed it was better to
cooperate with the police. They accepted the legitimacy of the warnings,
but decided that their best interests were served by not adjusting to the
options Miranda offered. There are several reasons why suspects might
come to a decision. One, of course, might be conscience: "I did it and I'm
sorry." Or a suspect might perceive that he or she couldn't hide guilt
anyway - witnesses might testify or damning evidence might already
be available - and might as well get it over with. Closely related to this
2000] 729
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
less other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his
right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scru-
pulously honored," procedural safeguards are the only way to ade-
quately protect the important constitutional rights involved.i0 0
The Court began limiting the scope of the Miranda decision shortly
after it was decided. For example, in Michigan v. Tucker,101 the Court
stated that the Miranda rights "were not themselves rights protected
by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."1 0 2 The Tucker
Court further explained that the decision was not intended to "'create
a constitutional straightjacket."'"o 3 Although Tucker reflected an ero-
sion of Miranda, the decision's core reasoning embraced the notion
that the Constitution mandated the creation of procedural rules to
protect a procedural constitutional right that was the logical result of
might be a suspect's calculation that he or she risks more - perhaps a
longer sentence - by defiance than by cooperation.
Most suspects quite naturally believed that refusing to talk or insist-
ing upon the presence of an attorney would be a tacit admission of guilt.
It follows that such behavior would only intensify police suspicion and
investigation. The best course, then, would be to deflect suspicion from
oneself by appearing to be cooperative. So in order to avoid detection
and punishment, some suspects take the risk of lying or telling less that
the whole truth.
CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION
AND IMPACT 121-22 (1984).
100. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
101. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
102. Id. at 444.
103. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). There is a difference
of opinion regarding whether Miranda has made police policy better. One com-
mentator has observed:
Did the Warren Court criminal justice decisions have any real effect
on the behavior of the police? Some have suggested that the criminal
justice decisions were a failure. It has been argued that while some Su-
preme Court decisions have resulted in allowing concededly guilty de-
fendants to go free, there has been no demonstrable beneficial change in
police practices. Some suggest that the police will always find their own
ways to evade constitutional rules; others maintain that even in the best
of circumstances the Supreme Court is just too distant from the day-to-
day decisions of the policeman on the beat or in the station house to have
any systematic effect on police behavior.
Yet we have come gradually to recognize that the culture of police
departments varies widely, depending on whether there is organiza-
tional leadership as well as serious training and education of recruits in
the values of civil liberties. This certainly suggests that different insti-
tutional practices and values can produce widely different organizational
attitudes toward obeying the law.
If we ask whether the culture of the police station has changed since
the Warren Court, the answer appears to be positive. Before the Warren
Court, several generations of official commissions had documented and
condemned the widespread brutality toward criminal suspects that had
become standard operating procedure in many police departments.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 96 (1998).
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the Fifth Amendment right against compelled testimony. If law en-
forcement wished to have the fruit of custodial interrogations, it
needed clear direction to help it take the affirmative steps necessary
to ensure that confessions were not illegally obtained.
IV. THE ACCOUNTABILITY VACUUM AND THE FLAWED
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENT JURISPRUDENCE
There is no subject in which the Supreme Court has rendered pre-
dictable results more unlikely then in the subject of searches and in-
terrogations based on alleged or legally constructed voluntary consent.
Ideas regarding consent have long been riddled with controversy. The
invisible dividing line between consent and coercion has been a main-
stay of police investigative technique,O4 and a source of confusion for
the average citizen. 0 5 Over half a century ago, the Supreme Court
104. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966)(recognizing that an under-
cover agent believed to be a friend does not invalidate a confession); see also Rich-
ard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police
Investigation in America, 18 Cmum, L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 35 (1992) (discussing
how police interrogation has changed in the last half-century).
105. Police sponsored literature that allegedly explains citizen responsibility when
confronted by police adds to the confusion. One such advisement suggests:
A traffic stop is one of the most frequent encounters between citizens
and police. Usually, police officers will pull a vehicle over if they have
reason to believe that some offense has occurred. You may feel anxious,
irritated at the delay, or concerned about a possible citation. However,
officers are also concerned about possible threats to their personal safety
while performing their duties.
The following recommended procedures will ensure that the traffic
stop can be completed quickly and safely.
When signalled [sic] by an officer, safely pull over to a place out of
traffic flow.
Sit calmly, with your hands visible on the steering wheel. If you have
passengers, ask them to sit quietly with their hands visible. (Avoid sud-
den movements or ducking in the seat; these actions can unnecessarily
alarm the officer.)
If it is night, turn on your inside light when you pull the car over. For
safety reasons, the officer will want to visually scan the car's interior
before proceeding.
Do not get out of your car unless the officer asks you to step out. If
you are asked to do so, comply in a calm manner.
A sure way to put an officer at ease is to communicate your actions in
advance by telling the officer what you will be doing before you move.
Also, you can ask to see the officer's identification.
If requested, you must give the officer your driver's license and vehi-
cle registration. Tell the officer where it is before reaching for it-espe-
cially if it is tucked away in the glove box or some other unusual place.
If you are issued a citation, you will be asked to sign it. Signing is not
an admission of guilt, but an acknowledgment that you have received
the citation. While you may wish to clarify the circumstances of the cita-
tion, keep in mind that your guilt or innocence can only be determined in
court. Arguments over or protests about the situation cannot be resolved
in the street.
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recognized the distinction between coercion and persuasion. In Davis
Baltimore County Police Dep't, What to Do If You Are Stopped By a Police Officer
(advisement distributed by police department regarding stops, searches, and
seizures)(emphasis in original).
Another pamphlet produced by a group of minority police officers along with
some civil rights organizations advises the following:
Stay in the driver's seat with both hands in sight on the steering
wheel. Do not exit your car unless asked to do so. Getting out of your
car can be perceived as aggressive behavior and a threat to the officer's
safety. Turn on your interior light if stopped at night.
Comply with the officer's request to see your driver's license and/or
registration. If they are in the glove box or under the seat, state that
and then retrieve them slowly.
If the officer has "probable cause," your car can be searched without a
court-issued warrant. If you are the driver and/or owner of the car and
do not want your vehicle searched, clearly inform the officer of your non-
consent in a polite manner.
If you are issued a ticket, sign it. Signing a ticket is not an admission
of guilt-only an acknowledgment of receiving the ticket. However, re-
fusal to sign a ticket could result in your being arrested and facing addi-
tional charges.
If you are suspected of drunk driving, cooperate with the officer(s) on
the scene. If you refuse to submit to breath, blood or performance tests,
your refusal may be interpreted as an indication of guilt in later court
proceedings. This could result in loss of driving privileges and/or heavy
fines.
Get out of the automobile if asked to do so.
Most officers will not provide specific reasons for the stop until they
have your license and registration in hand. Therefore, they will avoid
having to debate the reason for the stop before they receive these items
from you.
If you wish to offer an explanation of your circumstances when
stopped, do so before the officer returns to his vehicle. The officer cannot
void the ticket once it has been written. If you believe you have been
treated unfairly, present your case in traffic court and not to the officer
along the roadside.
If You are Arrested
When you are taken into custody, make sure that your house or car is
secure.
Make sure you have been informed as to why you are being arrested.
NOTE: A lawyer should be called as soon as possible. The advice
of an attorney is extremely important early in the process.
Under no circumstances should you make incriminating statements
which might be used against you at a later time.
In most states, you must be taken before a judge, magistrate, consta-
ble or court commissioner within 24 hours of your arrest. You should
secure legal representation before this initial court appearance.
Ask to telephone your parent, guardian, or lawyer immediately. You
have the right to make one phone call to the person of your choice; use
it. You also have the right to privacy during the call. If this right is
denied, do not cause a confrontation that might result in additional
charges being filed against you.
You should always have the number of a lawyer or a person you can
rely on to get you an attorney if your lawyer is unavailable. Keep a re-
cord of that number, as well as the name and number of a lawyer from
the local Public Defender's office, in your wallet or purse.
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v. United States, 06 a 1946 case, the defendant was said to have volun-
tarily agreed to a search and seizure after his arrest for selling gaso-
line coupons above the ceiling price.10 7 The Court found that the
officers had "persuaded" rather than "coerced" the defendant into con-
senting to the search, even though he had initially refused to open the
enclosed room where the suspected coupons were hidden.108 This
early case set a broad policy of flexibility regarding what the Supreme
Court considered appropriate consent.
By the late 1960s, the Supreme Court was not so willing to permit
police assertions of consent, holding that "[wihen a prosecutor seeks to
rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the bur-
den of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily
given."' 0 9 The Court commented, at least in the context of a search
warrant, that not all police techniques used to obtain consent were
necessarily appropriate. "When a law enforcement officer claims au-
thority to search a home under a search warrant, he announces in
effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situa-
tion is instinct with coercion .... Where there is coercion there can-
not be consent."il 0
Although it may have seemed that the burden of proving that con-
sent was voluntary was well established, by the early 1970s, the con-
sent doctrine regarding street and automobile encounters had been
called into serious question. In the case of Schneckloth v. Bus-
NAACP et al., The Law and You: Guidelines for Interacting with Law Enforce.
ment Officials (brochure produced in partnership by NAACP, National Organiza-
tion of Black Law Enforcement Executives, and Allstate Insurance
Company)(emphasis in original).
106. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
107. See id. at 585.
108. See id. at 593.
109. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). When I speak of the police,
one should understand that the prosecutor and police work as a team.
Together, the prosecutor and agent must plot strategy. The prosecu-
tor serves as the legal adviser for the investigation. Investigators who
execute search warrants improperly, fail to minimize electronic surveil-
lance, entrap defendants, or take statements from putative defendants
in violation of Miranda may jeopardize a prosecution; such investigative
errors can lead to suppression of critical evidence during the pretrial
stage. Prosecutors must therefore exercise close supervision of their
agents. Moreover, the prosecutor must be mindful of the statutes which
will serve as the basis of the prosecution. Working with the investiga-
tors, the prosecutor must seek to develop the evidence which will enable
a jury to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In each
investigation, the dynamic between prosecutor and investigator will
vary, and will reflect their individual experiences, knowledge, and per-
sonalities. Whatever the situation, a good prosecutor must be a talented
amateur sleuth, while a good investigator must be a solid amateur
lawyer.
GARY S. KATImNN, INSIDE THE CRIINNAL PROCESS 95 (1991).
110. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550.
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tamonte,111 the Supreme Court made "bright line" determinations of
voluntary consent virtually impossible. The Court held that when a
search subject was not in custody, the state must demonstrate that
consent was voluntarily given. 1 2 In attempting to make the requisite
showing, however, the subject's knowledge of his right to refuse is a
factor to be taken into account, but not a prerequisite to establishing
voluntary consent.113 Indeed, the Court characterized the precise
question in the case as "what must the prosecution prove to demon-
strate that a consent was 'voluntarily' given."1 14
In deciding the case, the Court adopted the "California rule" that
"voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances, and that the state of a defendant's knowledge
is only one factor to be taken into account in assessing the voluntari-
ness of a consent."" 5 Rejecting a "Miranda type test" that would re-
quire the informed consent of a subject who was under arrest prior to
a search, the Court reasoned that the arrest situation discussed in Mi-
randa was legally distinguishable. "The considerations that informed
the Court's holding in Miranda are simply inapplicable in the present
case. In Miranda the Court found that the techniques of police ques-
tioning and the nature of custodial surroundings produce an inher-
ently coercive situation."11 6 Also key to the Court's reasoning was its
conclusion that "since consent searches will normally occur on a per-
son's own familiar territory, the specter of incommunicado police in-
terrogation in some remote station house is simply inapposite."11 7
A concurring opinion filed by Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist made a scathing attack on the exclusionary
111. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
112. See id. at 222.
113. See id. at 227.
114. Id. at 223.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 246-47.
117. Id. at 247.
The most infamous Miranda scam of recent years was the one FBI
agents tried to pull on Richard Jewell, the security guard they suspected
had planted the bomb he'd found in an Atlanta park during the 1996
Olympics. The agents told Jewell that they wanted him to come to the
FBI office to help make a "training video" designed to teach agents how
to interview crime scene witnesses. Jewell agreed. While taping the
video, the agents pretended that their reading of Miranda and Jewell's
signing of the waiver were merely demonstrations of proper interview
techniques.
Later, after admitting that Jewell was innocent, the FBI issued a
halfhearted apology for what it termed the "training video ploy," but
then added that it "was not improper per se."
Ironically, the ploy backfired. Jewell, who had been eager to talk, got
suspicious and called his lawyer.
Peter Carlson, Cops, Suspects and the New Art of Interrogation, WASH. POST
MAG., Sept. 13, 1998, at 6, 19.
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rule.1 '5 In suggesting that a Fourth Amendment challenge should not
even be cognizable on habeas corpus review,119 the three concurring
Justices quoted a study by Professor Oaks:
What is known about the deterrent effect of sanctions suggests that the exclu-
sionary rule operates under conditions that are extremely unfavorable for de-
terring the police. The harshest criticism of the rule is that it is ineffective. It
is the sole means of enforcing the essential guarantees of freedom from unrea-
sonable arrests and searches and seizures by law enforcement officers, and it
is a failure in that vital task.120
They also noted Professor Oaks's statement that "'[oinly a system
with limitless patience with irrationality could tolerate the fact that
where there has been one wrong, the defendant's, he will be punished,
but where there have been two wrongs, the defendant's and the of-
ficer's, both will go free.'"1 2 1
Justice Douglas dissented, protesting that "verbal assent" to a
search was not sufficient. 12 2 He argued that "'a reasonable person
might read an officer's 'May I' as the courteous expression of a demand
backed by force of law,'"123 and complained that "[a] considerable con-
stitutional guarantee rides on this narrow issue."124 In a separate
dissent, Justice Brennan warned that under the majority's decision
"an individual can effectively waive this right even though he is totally
ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his consent, such invasions
of his privacy would be constitutionally prohibited."125 His dissent
concluded with a simple question that still emerges in the current Su-
preme Court search and seizure debate. He wrote, "[I]t wholly escapes
me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived some-
thing as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being
aware of its existence."126
In a final dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall suggested that the
Miranda analysis should be used to determine whether the defendant
118. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 250-75 (Powell, J., concurring).
119. This case represents a longstanding attack on habeas corpus that still continues
today. Justice Rehnquist, who was a concurring judge in Schneckloth, has long
encouraged limitations on a criminal defendant's access to the federal courts. As
one writer explains: "At the time of his nomination [to the Supreme Court] Rehn-
quist had urged sharp cut-backs in federal habeas corpus .... " EDWARD P. LAZA-
RUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEwrrNEss AccoUNT OF THE Epic STRUGGLES
INsmE THE SUPREAI COURT 105 (1998).
120. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 268 n.26 (Powell, J., concurring)(quoting Dallin H. Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665,
755 (1970)).
121. Id. (quoting Oaks, supra note 120).
122. See id. at 275 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 275-76 (quoting Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir.
1971)).
124. Id. at 276.




had "knowingly relinquished a right to be free of compulsion."' 27
Echoing the concerns of Justice Douglas, Justice Marshall reasoned
that "[if consent to search means that a person has chosen to forgo his
right to exclude the police from the place they seek to search, it follows
that his consent cannot be considered a meaningful choice unless he
knew that he could in fact exclude the police."' 28
Justice Marshall, however, went further than either Brennan or
Douglas by suggesting that the majority had engaged in an unconsti-
tutional allocation of the burden of proof.12 9 He explained that "the
question then is a simple one: must the Government show that the
subject knew of his rights, or must the subject know of his rights, or
must the subject show that he lacked such knowledge."' 30 He opined
that "any fair allocation of the burden would require that it be placed
on the prosecution."' 3 ' In explaining how the prosecutor might pro-
ceed to question a defendant from whom he sought information, Mar-
shall suggested that "[t]he burden on the prosecution would
disappear, of course, if the police, at the time they requested consent
to search, also told the subject that he had the right to refuse
consent."'132
In his final complaint against the majority, Justice Marshall said
that "[i]n the final analysis, the Court now sanctions a game of
blindman's buff, in which the police always have the upper hand, for
the sake of nothing more than the convenience of the police."' 33
The Supreme Court's split in Schneckloth set the stage for the
range of debate that would appear over the next three decades in
lower court and Supreme Court search and seizure opinions dealing
with consent.134 In 1980, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the princi-
127. Id. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 284-85.
129. See id. at 285.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 286.
133. Id. at 289-90.
134. Subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject of consent has broad-
ened the latitude of what can be interpreted as consent. See, e.g., Florida v. Bos-
tic, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)(holding that no seizure occurred when police
boarded a bus, randomly approached passengers, and then sought their consent
to search their belongings).
Schneckloth immediately generated a large body of scholarship that at-
tempted to analyze its holdings. For example, in William KIuwin & Joseph Wal-
kowski, Valid Consent to Search Determined by Standard of "Voluntariness-
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), 12 AM. CraM. L. REv. 231 (1974),
the authors questioned Schneckloth's interpretation of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938), which led the Court to the conclusion that if Johnson was ap-
plied to consent to search issues, it would create a greater burden on police work.
See Kiuwin & Walkowski, supra, at 244-45. Furthermore, the authors attacked
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ples of Schneckloth in United States v. Mendenhall.135 In that case,
agents who were wearing plain clothes approached Ms. Mendenhall in
a public area of an airport and requested to see her identification and
airline ticket.136 After returning her airline ticket and driver's li-
cense, one of the agents asked Mendenhall "if she would accompany
him to the airport DEA office for further questions. She did so, al-
though the record does not indicate a verbal response to the re-
quest."13 7 The officers testified that she became nervous after they
the actual outcome as broadening police power at the expense of civil liberties.
See id. at 247-48.
Eugene E. Smary, Note, The Doctrine of Waiver and Consent, 49 NOTRE D
L. REv. 891 (1974), was critical of the Court's refusal to extend Johnson and ques-
tioned that the knowing waiver is only applicable to the fairness of a trial. See id.
at 902. He also wondered what "makes an uninformed waiver of a fourth amend-
ment right fair, while the uninformed waiver of a trial right is unfair." Id.
In William R. Sage, Note, Criminal Procedure-Standards for Valid Consent
to Search, 52 N.C. L. REv. 644 (1974), the author addressed the issues of consent
and waiver and then examined the two policy considerations that go along with
these issues: the policy of permitting citizens to choose whether or not they wish
to exercise their constitutional right, and the policy of preventing coercion. See
id. The author believed that waiver best addressed both of these considerations
and that consent was the safeguard against coercion. See id.
Recent Development, Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizures-Fourth
Amendment Held Not to Require That One Giving Permission for a Consent
Search Be Informed That He Has the Right to Withhold His Consent, Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), 7 IND. L. REv. 592 (1974), criticized the dis-
parity between the rights that protect the truth finding procedure and the rights
that protect personal liberties. See id. This article also contended that the
Court's assumption that requiring police to give warnings would be too great of a
burden to police work was erroneous and then pointed to the fact that the FBI
had been doing it for years. See id. at 597.
In William Mehlhaf, Recent Decision, A Valid Consent to Search Does Not Re-
quire Knowledge of the Constitutionally Protected Right to Refuse--Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), 9 GoNz. L. REv. 845 (1974), the author at-
tacked the Schneckloth decision and argued that the "'the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments run almost into each other'" in their protections against state intru-
sions. Id. at 855 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). The
author suggested that a standard like that in Miranda be employed to do away
with the notion that consent is not a waiver of a constitutional right. See id. at
857.
Case Comment, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Validity of Con-
sent to Pre-Arrest Search to be Determined by Total Circumstances Test, 4 MEM-
PiUs ST. L. REv. 162 (1973), suggested that the Court's decision would lead to
fishing expeditions on the part of the police because most people will not be aware
that they can refuse such a search. See id. at 165.
The authors of The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Search and Seizure, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 196 (1973), felt that the lack of knowledge element was basically useless
because of the virtual impossibility of obtaining reliable evidence of what was
going on in a subject's mind at the time consent was sought. See id. at 220-21.
135. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
136. See id. at 547-48.
137. Id. at 548.
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began to question her.i38 In the midst of the questioning, the officers
finally identified themselves as federal narcotic agents.i 39 According
to the officers, Mendenhall's behavior fit the so-called "drug courier
profile."140 The agents noted several factors that led them to this
conclusion:
(1) the respondent was arriving on a flight from Los Angeles, a city believed by
the agents to be the place of origin for much of the heroin brought to Detroit;
(2) the respondent was the last person to leave the plane, "appeared to be very
nervous," and "completely scanned the whole area where [the agents] were
standing"; (3) after leaving the plane the respondent proceeded past the bag-
gage area without claiming any luggage; and (4) the respondent changed air-
lines for her flight out of Detroit.141
"The [district] court concluded that the agents' conduct in initially
approaching the respondent and asking to see her ticket and identifi-
cation was a permissible investigative stop under the standards of
Terry v. Ohio ... ."142 The Court, however, believed that it should still
analyze whether there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment
"when she went from the concourse to the DEA office."' 43 Noting that
the question of whether consent was "voluntary or was the product of
duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the total-
ity of all the circumstances,"' 44 the Court found that "the totality of
the evidence in this case was plainly adequate to support the District
Court's finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to accom-
pany the officers to the DEA office."' 4 5
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackman joined a concurring
opinion by Justice Powell wherein he believed that the stop of Men-
denhall did not constitute a seizure at all.' 4 6 He wrote that "courts
need not ignore the considerable expertise that law enforcement offi-
cials have gained from their special training and experience."'47 In a
dissenting opinion, Justice White, who was joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens, rejected the majority's "voluntary con-
sent" analysis.' 4s He concluded that none of Mendenhall's conduct,
"alone or in combination, [was] sufficient to provide reasonable suspi-




141. Id. at 548 n.1.
142. Id. at 549.
143. Id. at 557.
144. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
145. Id. at 558.
146. See id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 566.
148. See id. (White, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 572.
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The Court's suggestion that no Fourth Amendment interest possessed by Ms.
Mendenhall was implicated because she consented to go to the DEA office is
inconsistent with Dunaway and unsupported in the record. There was no evi-
dence in the record to support the District Court's speculation, made before
Dunaway was decided, that Ms. Mendenhall accompanied "Agent Anderson to
the airport DEA Office 'voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation with the
[agent's] investigation.' Ms. Mendenhall did not testify at the suppression
hearing and the officers presented no testimony concerning what she said, if
anything, when informed that the officers wanted her to come with them to
the DEA office. Indeed, the only testimony concerning what occurred between
Agent Anderson's "request" and Ms. Mendenhall's arrival at the DEA office is
the agent's testimony that if Ms. Mendenhall had wanted to leave at that
point she would have been forcibly restrained.16 0
Three years later, the Supreme Court heightened the confusion
over its consent doctrine when it decided Florida v. Royer.151 In yet
another airport case, the Court invalidated a stop and search on
Fourth Amendment grounds. 152 With facts shockingly similar to
those in Mendenhall, the Court held that Royer "was being illegally
detained at the time of his alleged consent to search his luggage."'153
In a plurality opinion15 4 announced by Justice White, the Court out-
lined the facts preceding the search:
On January 3, 1978, Royer was observed at Miami International Airport
by two plainclothes detectives of the Dade County, Fla., Public Safety Depart-
ment assigned to the county's Organized Crime Bureau, Narcotics Investiga-
tion Section. Detectives Johnson and Magdalena believed that Royer's
appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions fit the so-called "drug courier
proffie." Royer, apparently unaware of the attention he had attracted, pur-
chased a one-way ticket to New York City and checked his two suitcases, plac-
ing on each suitcase an identification tag bearing the name "Holt" and the
destination, "La Guardia." As Royer made his way to the concourse which led
to the airline boarding area, the two detectives approached him, identified
themselves as policemen working out of the sheriffs office, and asked if Royer
had a "moment" to speak with them; Royer said "Yes."
Upon request, but without oral consent, Royer produced for the detectives
his airline ticket and his driver's license. The airline ticket, like the baggage
identification tags, bore the name "Holt," while the driver's license carried re-
spondent's correct name, "Royer." When the detectives asked about the dis-
crepancy, Royer explained that a friend had made the reservation in the name
of "Holt." Royer became noticeably more nervous during this conversation,
whereupon the detectives informed Royer that they were in fact narcotic in-
vestigators and that they had reason to suspect him of transporting narcotics.
The detectives did not return his airline ticket and identification but asked
Royer to accompany them to a room, approximately 40 feet away, adjacent to
the concourse. Royer said nothing in response but went with the officers as he
had been asked to do. The room was later described by Detective Johnson as a
"large storage closet," located in the stewardesses' lounge and containing a
150. Id. at 575-76 (citations omitted).
151. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
152. See id. at 492.
153. Id. at 501.
154. A plurality opinion results when the Court cannot agree on the reasoning for a
decision, but a majority agrees with the result.
2000]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
small desk and two chairs. Without Royer's consent or agreement, Detective
Johnson, using Royer's baggage check stubs, retrieved the "Holt" luggage from
the airline and brought it to the room where respondent and Detective Magda-
lena were waiting. Royer was asked if he would consent to a search of the
suitcases. Without orally responding to this request, Royer produced a key
and unlocked one of the suitcases, which one detective then opened without
seeking further assent from Royer. Marihuana was found in that suitcase.1 5 5
Justice White reasoned that the process of taking Royer from the air-
port concourse to a more private area was the root of the constitu-
tional violation.15 6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell relied on the Court's deci-
sion in Mendenhall.157 Noting that he was the author of one of the
opinions in that case, he felt a need to repeat his statement that "the
public has a compelling interest in identifying by all lawful means
those who traffic in illicit drugs for personal profit."1SS Nevertheless,
he felt that the search in present case was invalid. In support of his
belief, he stated that the present case was strikingly different from
Mendenhall in that Royer was not free to walk away.15 9
In a more detailed concurring opinion, Justice Brennan believed
there was no need to reach the question of whether the initial stop was
valid, for even if it was, the officers' subsequent actions were clearly
illegal.16 0 However, he noted that he did not believe that the initial
stop was legal. 16 1 "It is simply wrong to suggest that a traveler feels
free to walk away when he has been approached by individuals who
have identified themselves as police officers and asked for, and re-
ceived, his airline ticket and driver's license."' 6 2
Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that "the police conduct in
this case was minimally intrusive."'16 3 He stated that "[t]he special
need for flexibility in uncovering illicit drug couriers is hardly debata-
ble."164 In another dissent, Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, argued that the search
was valid because it was "reasonable" as that term is used in the
Fourth Amendment.165 Also relying on Mendenhall, his opinion sug-
gested that Royer was not coerced.166 He argued that "[a]bsent any
evidence of objective indicia of coercion, and even absent any claim of
155. Id. at 493-94 (footnotes omitted).
156. See id. at 505.
157. See id. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 509.
160. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
161. See id. at 511-12.
162. Id. at 512.
163. Id. at 513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 519.
165. See id. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 532.
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such indicia by Royer, the size of the room itself does not transform a
voluntary consent to search into a coerced consent."167
The Royer formulation, which placed emphasis on the coercive po-
lice conduct that involved the failure of the police officers to inform
Royer of their intentions, is the desirable approach. The Mendenhall
approach, however, which built on Schneckloth's flawed reasoning
that minimized actual proof of consent, is the more logical approach.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was only able to embrace a more
accountable consent standard in a plurality opinion. In the consent
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court that related to search and
seizure matters, the logic of Schneckloth and Mendenhall ultimately
became the standard for evaluating the adequacy of consent. Thus,
since the law would rarely deny police the fruit of their aggressive
investigations, the scales were tipped in their favor and they were
thereby encouraged to press hard to obtain consent even though their
conduct may well have been coercive to the average citizen. The Su-
preme Court's lukewarm regard for protecting citizens from aggres-
sive police efforts to obtain consent to search during routine
investigations created a severe accountability vacuum that en-
couraged police abuse.
V. PERCEPTION ACCOUNTABILITY: OF RACE AND MEN
No discussion of modern search and seizure jurisprudence would
be complete without examining the role racial considerations play in
law enforcement.1 6 8 In many ways, the discussion is often considered
repetitive and trite because so many voices speak on the subject. 16 9
This nation's inability to make progress on the issue of racial discrimi-
nation in law enforcement may be what leads us to constantly revisit
the discussion. At least two inescapable questions emerge from an ex-
amination of the impact of discrimination. First, does law enforce-
ment systematically use racial considerations improperly in enforcing
167. Id.
168. The Supreme Court has rarely given the question of race much weight in shaping
its jurisprudence. One insightful scholar wrote that "social science data reflect[s]
[that] the court has underestimated the extent to which racial factors affected an
individual officer's perceptions, memory, and reporting, transforming what may
be innocent behavior into indicia of criminality and the basis for a search or
seizure." Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 956, 1012 (1999).
169. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 20, at 558.
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the law?170 Second, are there any tools that can reduce discrimination
in police search and seizure activities?'17
The first of these questions is easier to answer than the second. At
the outset, one should note that the Supreme Court has long grappled
with the pervasive problem of racial discrimination in law enforce-
ment and has acknowledged that it "remains a fact of life[ I in the ad-
ministration ofjustice."172 Racial bias on the part of police has been a
primary concern in minority communities for a long time.173 Consid-
ering that affluent communities often praise vigorous police enforce-
ment against strangers in their neighborhoods; 174 that crime control
repeatedly tops the list of major public concerns, particularly among
the middle and upper class;175 that political rhetoric on the issue of
tough law enforcement has launched and sustained political ca-
reers; 176 and that the public is focused on attaining safe streets,
schools, and work places, the criminal justice community has done a
surprisingly poor job of removing the specter of racial discrimination
from the equations used in the development of effective law enforce-
170. The United States imprisons African-American men at a rate six times
that of white men. African-Americans are incarcerated at a rate of 1,947
per 100,000 African-American citizens compared to a rate of 306 per
100,000 for white citizens. African-American males make up less than 7
percent of the U.S. population, yet they comprise almost half of the
prison and jail population. In 1992, 56 percent of all African-American
men aged 18 to 35 in Baltimore were under some form of criminal justice
supervision on any given day. In the District of Columbia, the figure
was 42 percent. One out of every three African-American men between
the ages of 20 and 29 in the entire country-including suburban and
rural areas-was under some form of criminal justice supervision in
1994.
THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COM-
MISSION 102 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996).
171. Civil suits and the exclusionary rule have been questioned with regard to their
effectiveness in curbing police abuses. "Pattern and practice suits against police
departments, unfortunately, are very difficult to win." Alison L. Patton, The
Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police
Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 798 (1993).
172. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979).
173. See Thompson, supra note 39.
174. See generally Koledner v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352 (1983)(involving the constitution-
ality of a California statute that made it illegal for a person to loiter or wander
around and then refuse to identify himself when requested to do so by the police).
175. As one commentator has explained, "the hated criminals whose rights the politi-
cians refuse to countenance are the violent murderers, terrorists, and drug deal-
ers who inspire fear and hatred in suburban voters whose status as 'swing voters'
in the modern electoral calculus invites tough-on-crime posturing from both polit-
ical parties." Scott Moss, An Appeal By Any Other Name: Congress's Empty Vic-
tory Over Habeas Rights, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 249, 249-50 (1996).




ment tools.177 Indeed, the perception that discrimination is rampant
may well be stronger now than at any time since the end of Jim
Crow' 7 8 and the modern civil rights era.179
The use of race in police conduct has taken center stage as America
enters the twenty-first century. Recently, African American automo-
bile drivers have become the focus of national attention.18O A recent
Florida case is typical. Aaron Campbell, an African American Dade
County Police Major, was stopped on the Florida Turnpike.' 8 ' Camp-
bell alleged that he was a victim of racial stereotyping when he was
cursed and grabbed by the arresting officer.' 8 2 He was charged with
and acquitted of battery, but was convicted of two minor misdemeanor
counts.' 83 The trial judge ruled that Campbell was the victim of an
illegal racial profile that Florida officers used to detain drug sus-
pects. 84 The officers denied racism, but critics of the incident be-
lieved that the only crime Campbell committed was driving while
Black.' 8 5
The story is typical, with the minority detainee accusing the officer
of racism and the officer denying any such claim. The reality of what
took place gets neatly locked away in the heads of the participants and
is rarely accessible to a judge or jury.'8 6 However, the frequency of
177. See generally Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary
Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L.
REv. 243 (1991).
178. Jim Crow describes the period of time when the segregation of minorities was
legally mandated. See C. VAN WOODWARD, Tim STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(3d rev. ed. 1974).
179. The tensions between minorities and police have not diminished despite recent
gains in civil rights. Events like the New York police shooting of a black man 41
times during a street encounter suggest that the racial issues are still present.
As famed writer and lawyer Scott Turow recently commented, "I find it hard to
imagine the police shooting 41 times at a white man in a middle-class area stand-
ing peaceably in his doorway." Scott Turow, You Think You Know Why the Diallo
Cops Were Acquitted. Think Again. WASH. PosT, Mar. 5, 2000, at Bl.
180. See DAvID HARIus, AAmRiCAN CivIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE BLAcic RA-
cLL PROFmING ON OUR NAiON's IGHWAYS (1999).
181. See Debbie Salamone, Miami Cop Found Guilty but Only on Lesser Charge, OR-
LANO SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 1998, at Al.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. Some commentators have strongly suggested that "African-American
men have become fair game for police harassment whenever they travel in public,
be it by plane, car, bus, train, or foot .... '[C]onsent' and 'free-to-leave' doctrines
prove unworkable given the racially abusive history between police and minori-
ties." Erika L. Johnson, "A Menace to Society": The Use of Criminal Profiles and
its Effects on Black Males, 38 How. L.J. 629, 663 (1995).
185. See Salamone, supra note 181, at Al.
186. Perhaps changing the burden of proof will help adjust for the potential, subcon-
scious, racial bias in the decision making process of a suppression hearing. Even
the most well regarded jurists have acknowledged that the judicial process is
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the allegations of racism should give us pause before we so easily dis-
miss the possibility of a systemic problem of discriminatory
conduct.18 7
Studies have been conducted that examine race as a factor in police
decision-making. One such study focused on the reasons for and the
results of police encounters with citizens.1 8s Higlights from the
study indicate that Hispanics and African Americans are about sev-
enty percent more likely to come in contact with police than whites.1S 9
Other studies have strongly suggested that police single out minority
motorists.190
often subject to the subconscious forces operating within the various actors in the
legal system. Justice Benjamin Cardozo once wrote:
I have spoken of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape
the form and content of their judgments. Even these forces are seldom
fully in consciousness. They lie so near the surface, however, that their
existence and influence are not likely to be disclaimed.... Deep below
consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predictions
and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and
convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921).
187. Those who are not regularly subject to the effects of racism often dismiss the
problem. Thus, the suggestion that we live in a colorblind society is an illusion.
One writer has commented that
[uin lieu of scientific research [dismissing discrimination,] we are offered
speculation and conjecture, self-congratulatory theories from whites who
have never been forced to confront the racial stereotypes routinely en-
countered by blacks, and who -judging themselves decent people, and
judging most of their acquaintances decent as well - find it impossible to
believe that serious discrimination still exists.
ELLIS CosE, THE RAGE OF A PRILEGED CLASS 3 (1993).
Direct police bias has been historically documented in this country. For exam-
ple, one report noted:
Almost all police officers firmly believe that they do treat citizens alike,
regardless of race or color. Nevertheless, policemen are human beings
and like everyone else they have opinions and prejudices. "Police officers
often fail to realize that their prejudices make impartiality impossible.
Believing, as many do, that 'Negroes have criminal tendencies' leads to
unconscious discrimination."-Attorney General's representative,
Richmond.
A high ranking peace officer in California once stated in an official report
that Mexicans had a "biological disregard for the value of life," that they
had an "inborn desire to kill or at least let blood." Negroes, also, he said,
had this same hereditary blood lust, while Filipinos were biologically
disposed to crimes of violence, especially over women.
JOHN R. SNIBBE & HomA M. SNIBBE, THE URBAN POLICEMAN IN TRANSITION: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEw 308 (1973).
188. See Lawrence A. Greenfield et al., Police Use of Force Collection of National Data,
U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics Paper No. NCJ-165040
(Nov. 1997), available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/pub/bjs/ascii/puof.txt> (last
visited May 3, 1998).
189. See id.
190. See Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civil-
ian Review Boards, 28 CoLuMi. HUm. RTs. L. REV. 551, 558-65 (1997).
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When race is used as a factor in traffic stops, the problems with
police usually intensify because more invasive searches often follow.
The practice of using race as a factor in making vehicle stops has led
to the phrase "driving while Black."'9 This phrase describes the phe-
nomenon of stopping Blacks without proper cause, performing what
often becomes an invasive search,192 and then releasing them without
charging them for violating any traffic laws.' 9 3 In order to cope with
the problem, African American drivers have developed "survival tech-
niques" to avoid being pulled over by police.1 94
Pro-law enforcement trends have emerged in the country;195 how-
ever, these trends have been questioned. Studies have determined
that police often use discretionary police stops to investigate crime for
which they would otherwise lack reasonable, articulable suspicion. 9 6
The typical law enforcement approach is to stop a vehicle under the
pretext of a traffic violation and then conduct a plain view search of
the vehicle.197 The empirical evidence in one study was taken from
Florida and revealed that eighty-two percent of all vehicles searched
after stops were those of Black or Hispanic drivers. 198 Similarly, a
report released in 1999 by The American Civil Liberties Union, which
suggests that local police often discriminate when they search for evi-
dence by targeting minorities, has also raised concerns. 199 This re-
port 2o o cites statistics that show that during a recent nine-month
191. See id. at 551.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 551-52.
194. See id. at 552. Examples of"survival techniques" include renting a bland vehicle
instead of a flashy one, strictly obeying speed limits, and avoiding driving a vehi-
cle with tinted windows. See id.
195. The need to control rising crime over the last two decades has resulted in greater
deference to law enforcement.
196. See Hecher, supra note 90.
197. See id. at 558-59.
198. See id. at 560.
199. See HARIS, supra note 180.
200. Progressive attorneys and organizations like the ACLU have often advanced un-
popular causes.
The role of progressive lawyers is not only to engage in crucial defensive
practices - liberal practice vis-A-vis the courts - but also to preserve,
recast and build on the traces and residues of past conflicts coded in
laws. This latter activity is guided by a deep historical sensibility that
not only deconstructs the contradictory character of past and present le-
gal decisions, or demystifies the power relations operative in such deci-
sions; it also concocts empowering and enabling narratives that cast
light on how these decisions constitute the kind of society in which we
live, and how people resist and try to transform it. Progressive lawyers
can be politically engaged narrators who tell analytically illuminating
stories about how the law has impeded or impelled struggles for justice
and freedom. Like rap artists of the best sort, progressive lawyers can
reach out to a demoralized citizenry, to energize them with insights
about the historical origins and present causes of social misery in light of
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period, nearly seventy-three percent of the drivers searched during
routine traffic stops on 1-95 north of Baltimore were Black.201
Earlier this year, New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman
dismissed her Chief of Troopers after he defended racial profiling stat-
ing that "mostly minorities" trafficked in marijuana and cocaine.20 2
At the time, New Jersey, like Maryland and a host of other states, was
being sued for racial profiling abuses.20 3 The discrimination problem
has also been noticed at the federal level. Currently, Representative
John Conyers2 04 is sponsoring a bill that would require the Attorney
General to collect data, including the race of the drivers stopped and
other information about any searches performed by police, in pursuit
of curbing discrimination. 2 05
Critics of profiling have not been limited to the liberal organiza-
tions. Representative Henry Hyde206 has been on a mission to control
the conduct of local police in the area of asset forfeiture, which is the
process by which police seize private property from those merely sus-
pected of committing crime. In his book on the subject, Representative
Hyde said that "he was struck by the fact that so many minorities are
being victimized by forfeiture abuses - stopped for matching drug
courier profiles of the most stereotypical kind"207 - and described
that practice as "devastatingly destructive."2 08 We will not be able to
develop accountability solutions that take racial considerations into
account without nationally recognizing that police discrimination, be
it conscious or subconscious, 20 9 has a profound effect on the perception
visions, analyses and practices to change the world. Lawyers can per-
form this role more easily than others due to the prestige and authority
of the law in American society. Progressive lawyers can seize this oppor-
tunity to highlight the internal contradictions and the blatant hypocrisy
of much of the law in the name of the very ideals-fairness, protection,
formal equality-heralded, by the legal system.
CORNEL WEST, KEEPING FAITH: PHILOSOPHY AND RACE IN AMERICA 242 (1993).
201. See HARRIS, supra note 180.
202. New Jersey's state police have recently come under fire for racial profiling. Police
superintendent Colonel Carl Williams was fined by then Governor Whitman after
being quoted as saying, "cocaine and marijuana traffickers were most likely to be
members of minority groups." Lisa Walter, Comment, Eradicating Racial Stere-
otyping from Terry Stops: The Case for an Equal Protection Exclusionary Rule, 71
U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 260 (2000).
203. See HARRIS, supra note 180.
204. Congressman John Conyers is a liberal representative from Michigan.
205. See Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 2000, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (2000).
206. Congressman Hyde is a well known conservative legislator who has been in-
volved in limiting government abuse in seizing assets.
207. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OuR PROPERTY RIGHTS: Is YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM
SEIZURE? 43 (1995).
208. Id. at 44.
209. See COSE, supra note 187.
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of the fairness of law enforcement. 210 In order for communities to
fashion effective legislative solutions, the majority community has to
perceive that racial discrimination is a real and not imagined prob-
lem.2 11 To once again simply acknowledge that discrimination is a
problem and fail to do anything to solve it would be pointless.212
VI. ACCOUNTABILITY SOLUTIONS
The Warren Court's attempts to secure rights for the accused
through well intentioned opinions often resulted in opinions that were
difficult to justify under traditional scholarly analysis2'3 and that
were often crafted in a way that subjected them to attack.214 Never-
theless, the shortcomings advanced by the critics regarding the
Court's approach to constitutional decision-making should also recog-
nize that the goal of government accountability in criminal prosecu-
210. The only way to reduce potential elements of racism is to make police more ac-
countable to the rule of law across the board. One thoughtful observer has noted:
Often, the patterns of harassment were more than isolated incidents of
sidewalk justice dispensed by rogue cops. In fact, they reflected a wide-
spread pattern of police abuses rooted in departmental policies. In some
cases, police departments created roving task forces that swooped down
on high-crime neighborhoods and conducted indiscriminate street stops
and searches.
David Cole, Unequal Justice, BALT. SUN, May 16, 1999, at C1.
211. See A. LEON IGG mOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLrrIcs AND PRE-
sUmrIONs OF THE AmERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996).
212. Some scholars have forcefully argued that the greatest potential for discrimina-
tion occurs when these racial factors emerge. "Accordingly, in a contest between
whites and blacks, the Law presumptively protects whites. In a conflict between
relative harms between whites and blacks, the Law punishes blacks more se-
verely when they offend whites." Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth and
Narrative in the Social Construction of the Black Self, 40 How. L.J. 1, 85 (1996).
213. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959)(advancing the proposition that the Warren Court
did not rely on neutral principles in its constitutional adjudication). The so-called
neutral principles concept rests on the notion that it will make constitution deci-
sion-making more predictable. The very demand for strict adherence to neutral
principles has been criticized from its inception. See Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F.
Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV.
661 (1960).
214. A primary motivation for the defendant-oriented decisions of the Warren Court
was the concern that rules of law would create an unreasonable risk to the safety
of police.
Officers on the street confronting potentially armed and dangerous sus-
pects are required to make a "quick decision" as to how to protect them-
selves. To subject their measurement of what is needed to protect
themselves to post hoc second guessing to scrutinize whether they en-
gaged in the least intrusive means of effecting the goal of the intrusion
places an unrealistic and dangerous burden on police.
Thomas K. Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat-Downs, or Frisks?: The Scope of the
Permissible Intrusion to Ascertain if a Detained Person is Armed, 82 MARQ. L.
REv. 491, 517 (1999).
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tions is the primary focus of a large portion of the Bill of Rights.215
They should also take into account the fact that our country has a
history of largely ignoring the rights of the poor, oppressed, and those
in the minority, even after express language was written in the Con-
stitution to protect them.2 16
The only way to reconcile such a dilemma is to identify the princi-
ples that support accountability and adherence to the textual constitu-
tional rights,217 then reinforce judicial doctrines, legislation, and
policies that encourage clear compliance with those fundamental con-
stitutional commands. 21 8 Thus, penalizing police by excluding ille-
gally seized evidence may be warranted if violations of clear search or
interrogation requirements are established. Unfortunately, the Su-
preme Court's more recent jurisprudence pays little attention to the
accountability principles inherent in the Warren Court's jurispru-
dence.21 9 The consequence of deconstructing those opinions while ig-
noring the accountability principles they embrace is a perception that
the Supreme Court is abandoning its constitutional role as the struc-
tural guardian of the criminal adjudication process. 2 20
215. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the Bill of Rights are primarily con-
cerned with matters of criminal procedure.
216. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962).
217. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
218. If the central task of the administration of criminal law is to balance
the conflicting principles of order and of legality, the dilemma is epito-
mized in the question of police discretion. Whether one sees legality as
being undermined for the sake of order, or vice versa, the issue reduces
to whether there ought to be a loosening or a tightening of restraints on
the decisional latitude of police. The issue has recently been given in-
creasing attention by legal scholars concerned primarily with how much
discretion police ought to have and how this discretion may be con-
trolled. All conclude that criminal law enforcement can be substantially
improved by introducing arrangements to heighten the visibility of po-
lice discretion to permit its control by higher authority.
JEROME H. SKOLIciK, JusTIcE WITHOUT TRIAL 71 (2d ed. 1975).
219. Critiques suggesting that the Warren Court jurisprudence solely embraces a pol-
icy-oriented approach to criminal justice issues are somewhat misguided.
However, courts that at one time make wise policies may at another time
make foolish ones; judges who are initially benevolent may in time be-
come despotic. The fundamental safeguard in the American political
process against such misfortunes lies in the fragmentation of the poli-
cymaking and policy-executing processes. The courts cannot impose
their will single handedly upon the nation. They succeeded in imposing
the Warren decisions because those policies represented the conscience
and latent policy preferences of a large segment of the population. Oppo-
nents could not successfully mobilize the agencies of representative gov-
ernment against those policies.
HERBERT JAcoB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: CouRTs, LAwYERS, AND THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS 256-57 (4th ed. 1984).
220. In Miranda, the Warren Court attempted to build a protective structure around
the important constitutional rights for the accused in order to give those provi-
sions meaning. See generally Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and
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In the short run, little can be done about the turn the Court has
taken away from the Warren Court's embrace of accountability princi-
ples. Too much time has passed and too many cases have been de-
cided that have chipped away at the fabric of the Warren Court's
primary opinions that applied the criminal procedure concepts of the
Bill of Rights to the states.22 ' Even a sudden change in the Court's
makeup would be unlikely to result in accountability principles that
would affect a broad range of cases in the way that Miranda222 con-
trolled police behavior. The Supreme Court simply does not reach
enough controversies to restore the accountability principles that have
been lost or overshadowed by the sometimes methodical process by
which the unfavorable, "liberal" results of many Warren Court deci-
sions have been eroded.223
Perhaps the Warren Court overplayed its hand in expanding Due
Process concepts without carefully crafting its opinions in a narrow
manner that would have made them more resistant to long term at-
tack.22 4 In that regard, its decisions may be as much to blame for the
lack of stability in constitutional adjudication as the more conserva-
tive forces that did not like what they believed to be a result oriented
approach.225 That intellectual battle, however, is no excuse for leav-
ing the citizens of this country with little guidance on what rules the
police and prosecution must follow as they bring suspected offenders
to justice. 226 The confusion in the law creates an incentive for officers
the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465, 471 (1999)(stating that "a prophylactic
rule is not a dirty word" and that such rules are sometimes "necessary and
proper").
221. For an early examination of the incorporation principle, see Charles Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Un-
derstanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
222. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 554-55
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
223. See generally Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Mi-
randa's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084 (1996)(weighing the costs and benefits
of the Miranda decision).
224. See Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Tri-
umph Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIi. L. REv. 243 (1987).
225. See id.
226. The problem with leaving prosecutors and police without guidance becomes clear
when one considers the consequences of a twenty-four year-old officer exercising
great discretion without adequate training.
Some police forces use legal techicalities to selectively stop and search
cars. The Tinicum, Pennsylvania police department from 1989 to 1992
routinely stopped blacks and Hispanics driving through or near the town
on the pretext of a motor vehicle code provision that prohibits cars from
having rabbit's feet, dice, or air freshners hanging on the rearview
mirror...
JAmEs BovARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 230 (1994).
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to push the limits since the Supreme Court is clearly becoming less
likely to sanction them22 7 through the suppression of evidence.
The only alternative may be to resort to locally heightened and
sanctioned police review. This will require citizens to carefully con-
sider policies and approaches that may be used to monitor the actions
of local police. The reliance on judicial controls has proven to be a
mistake because such reliance is inefficient. 228 That is not to say that
sound jurisprudence that protects the rights of the accused is still not
required, it simply cannot be relied on as the primary tool for enforc-
ing police accountability. 2 29
Recently, the problem of police abuse during the questioning and
searching of suspects has received considerable attention.2 30 Such
misconduct has led to various procedures, such as the implementation
of civilian review boards to investigate and make recommendations as
to what to do about the problem. 2 3 ' However, one civil liberties organ-
ization that recently investigated police conduct in New York City con-
cluded that "[f]rom its inception New York's all-civilian review board
has been implemented in a manner that virtually ensured it would not
provide the oversight called for in the City Charter ... [because the
agency] has been significantly understaffed and under funded."232
One of the problems was the inability of the review board to fully in-
vestigate police misconduct complaints.2 33 Such a failure to provide
227. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 32 (1995)(criticizing post-Warren Courts for bal-
ancing away too much of the Fourth Amendment's protection).
228. When courts fail to enforce rights, the absence of legislative action results in a
void.
229. The nature of legal appeals makes the police response to the slow results virtu-
ally meaningless.
230. The news media has published many instances of allegations of police abuse. See
Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While Black:" Corollary Phenomena and Collateral
Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REv. 717 (1999)(collecting many popular press accounts
of racial discrimination and abuse by police in encounters with minorities).
231. Some recent efforts to implement civilian review boards have been successful.
Insofar as community-based policing mitigates the unreliability of police
intuition in community criminal law-deployment, it may foster state-
community exchange and dialogue... Not only do civilian review boards
serve a symbolic function of demonstrating state interest in racial equity
and tolerance, the assistance or the prosecution in instituting commu-
nity policing promises community through group connection and mercy.
Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 809, 827-28 (2000). See Benjamin B. Tucker, How Do We Reduce Crime and
Preserve Human Decency? The Role of Leadership in Policing for a Democratic
Society, 28 FoRDHAm UPB. L.J. 601, 615 (2000)(noting police community tensions
as the basis for poor police community relations).
232. NYCLU, supra note 75.
233. The report stated the following:
[Tihe CCRB has failed to conduct complete investigations into the over-
whelming majority of police misconduct complaints received. In its five
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rapid enforcement of sanctions against errant police officers will lead
to disrespect for the accountability procedures.2 34
One insightful recommendation to improve police accountability is
to establish a separate legal unit to prosecute citizen review board
complaints. 2 35 The system of internal police review is said to be sus-
pect if it "does not give civilian complaints a fair hearing."2 3 6
As one judicial expert has observed: If an investigating body cannot conduct
its own prosecutions, the entire process will suffer from a lack of accountabil-
ity.... If the [CCRB's] attorneys knew while they were investigating a com-
plaint that they would ultimately have to present evidence at a disciplinary
hearing, their investigations would probably be more thorough, and their
judgments on what was provable would be more reliable. In short, there would
be far more accountability. 2 3 7
An independent review process may also have the advantage of
leading to more meaningful disciplinary action for police officers who
are the subject of substantiated complaints. "The overwhelming ma-
jority of substantiated police misconduct complaints referred to the
police department result in no disciplinary action.... In the unlikely
event a police officer is disciplined, the punishment is typically light
- loss of a few vacation days."238
I believe that aggressive action is needed at the state23 9 level to
not only ensure that police will be held accountable for their actions,
years of operation the CCRB has received approximately 25,800 com-
plaints. Of the 24,300 complaints disposed of by the CCRB, only about 36
percent have been fully investigated. Of the 8,700 complaints that have
received a full investigation, 60 percent have resulted in a record insuffi-
cient to support a finding. In other words, only about one in seven com-
plaint investigations have resulted in a finding based on the merits.
Id. The fact that police complaints are not promptly processed likely contributes
to the problem of law enforcement accountability.
234. "A weak civilian review agency emboldens police officers with a propensity to
abuse their power, and gives false assurance to civilians who file a complaint of
police misconduct with the expectation justice will be done." Id.
235. See id.
236. Id. Elected public officials have expressed the idea that good police/community
relations begin with the attitude of police toward minority citizens. The former
Mayor of Detroit, Coleman Young, expressed that view in his autobiography. He
wrote, "For nearly twenty years, I had emphasized a firm but respectful style of
law enforcement. I had campaigned on that issue and fought over it with the
veteran cops. The police department's attitude adjustment had been the first pri-
ority of my first term .... " COLEMAN YOUNG & LONm WHEELER, HARDSTUFF:
THE AuTOBIOGRAPHY OF CoLENL&N YOUNG 321 (1994).
237. NYCLU, supra note 75.
238. Id.
239. One course of action would be to enact state statutes that place limitations on
police discretion and provide for financial compensation when police make mis-
takes. "[Girowing numbers of law enforcement agencies have been morally and
sometimes criminally deformed by their dependence on drug war financing. In
Paducah, Kentucky, the lawless operations of one agency.., came to light when
the discovery of almost $66,000 secreted in its headquarters provoked an official
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but also to restore predictability to at least the basic confusion the
Court created during its philosophical battle24 0 over its supervisory
role in the criminal justice system. As I have already discussed, the
burden of proof can be used as a tool to enforce accountability, 24 1 and
has in fact been a basic tool in maintaining responsibility in legal doc-
trines.24 2 In the weighing and balancing of justice, the allocation of
evidentiary burdens is the principle means by which judicial struc-
tures are given meaningful guidance. Ultimately, the burden of proof
determines who must push the pile, move the load, or tip the legal
scale.243 Placing the burden of proof on the prosecution will permit
judges to reject searches made by police when they are skeptical of an
officer's basis for the search but are not prepared to declare him a
liar.2 4 4
Changes to the burden of proof also offer the advantage of provid-
ing a "structural adjustment"245 to the system. That is, once the fun-
damental changes in the allocation of responsibility take place,
subjective factors, like the subconscious motives of police when they
conduct a search, will have a more limited effect on the outcome. 246
Police departments will find it advantageous to develop procedures, 247
forms, 248 and training2 49 to support the searches they conduct on citi-
inquiry and a major scandal." Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, The Drug War's
Hidden Economic Agenda, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 1998, at 15.
240. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 66.
241. Concerns regarding the burden of proof touch all phases of a criminal case. Its
allocation on issues other than the ultimate verdict may be critical. As one in-
sightful observer has noted, a defendant generally will not benefit from going
forward first, at any phase of a criminal trial, because police will "conform their
testimony." See ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIM-
INAL CASES § 252 (5th ed. 1988).
242. The Supreme Court has held that in establishing the voluntariness of a confes-
sion, the prosecution need not satisfy the burden beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972).
243. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact,
27 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975)(arguing that burden of proof standards help to pro-
tect against the Justices' practice of giving weight to unreliable confessions).
244. In a contest of integrity, the defendant usually loses. See DONALD A. DRIPPS, PO-
LICE, PLUS PERJURY EQUALS POLYGRAPH, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 696
(1996)(pointing out that a judge has difficulty spotting perjury since he must "de-
cide cases one at a time, so the police almost always win the swearing contest"
between the officer and the defendant).
245. Structures for police review should be adopted.
246. Knowing that the higher standard exists, police will be more careful.
247. Giving police the first opportunity to correct the problems will likely have the
greatest long-term effect.
248. Forms establish a recorded written record, which establishes accountability.
Some states have already begun the process of collecting information. "Without
admitting wrongdoing, several police departments across the country have
agreed to start collecting racial data on who is stopped and why." Florangela




zens. This will lead to more properly justified searches, and thus to
greater confidence in police integrity.250
The Supreme Court's consent decisions have permitted the police
to exercise too much inadequately controlled discretion 25 1 during
street level confrontations with suspected offenders. 2 52 No case is
likely to come along that would permit the Court to clarify the utter
absence of standards and constitutional guidance its cases have cre-
ated.2 53 Thus, state and perhaps federal legislation should be devel-
oped to supply the necessary guidance. 25 4 I propose laws that would
require the prosecution to show by clear and convincing evidence that
a confession or consent to a warrantless search was properly obtained
before the fruits of the search or the confession could be introduced
into evidence.2 55 This standard would discourage the fabrication of a
factual basis for searches that were pretextual from their inception.25 6
Indeed, much of the rationale for this principle can be identified in the
249. The training of police is the key to ensuring that they understand what is ex-
pected of them. Many police agree that more training is needed: "tihey de-
scribed training as inadequate, particularly in the use of force." Editorial,
Misperceptions Feed Zero-Tolerance Scare, BALT. SUN, Apr. 9, 2000, at 2C.
250. Police integrity has been compromised by citizen conflict in recent years.
251. Without adequate structural guidance, police are simply overwhelmed with the
basics of doing their job, which affects the efficiency with which they exercise
their discretion.
Neglect has permeated every aspect of the police function and left law
enforcement unable to provide its essential services effectively. Jurisdic-
tion, organization, definition of service, personnel and performance are
all inadequate to present needs. The fragmentation of police jurisdic-
tions alone makes excellence impossible and effectiveness limited. The
nation has a crazy-quilt pattern of 40,000 police jurisdictions ....
RaIsEY CLARK, CRIME IN AmERICA: OBSERVATION ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, PRE-
VENTION AND CONTROL 132 (1970).
252. One attorney advised that citizens have no good reason to comply with police in a
street level encounter.
The best policy is to refuse the search request. Even if you think you
have nothing to hide, the best policy is to still say no. Why? Allowing
the police to search you, especially while traveling, only opens you up to
any number of problems: if a yes is given, then you have no defense if
any contraband is discovered. This is advisable because you may not
even be aware of what exactly constitutes contraband.
Walter L. Gordon HI, Button Your Lip!, CODE, Jan. 2000, at 48.
253. Since changing constitutional law requires litigants in actual cases to present
their cases in court, making policy changes though court action is not as respon-
sive as direct legislative action. Courts simply cannot remedy even their own
erroneous judgments very easily.
254. See HYDE, supra note 207, at 55-56.
255. See id. at 59.
256. It has long been recognized that police officers often exercise a great deal of dis-
cretion at the street level that is unseen by their supervisors. See Joseph Gold-
stein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 552-53 (1960). Thus,
there is a potential for police to substitute pretextual reasons for the truth.
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United States v. Leon 2 57 and Illinois v. Gates258 good faith exception
doctrine, which gives heightened protection to searches that were sup-
ported by warrants because of the accountability exercised by an of-
ficer who seeks a magistrate's guidance before intruding on an
individuals privacy.259
Some states have rejected the good faith exception.260 Neverthe-
less, the idea of giving the police flexibility only when they have
respected the accountability principle is a sound structural concept be-
cause it would encourage officers to rely on the accountability princi-
ple in order to obtain the benefit of the more forgiving search and
seizure standard.261 Thus, the good faith exception would put police
on fair notice that going too far would lead to the exclusion and sup-
pression of illegally obtained evidence if they decide to ignore availa-
ble accountability principles and opt for a risk laden approach that is
not reviewable. 262 As a result, society should expect police to blame
themselves for making decisions that result in a sanction.263 Ironi-
cally, this principle operates in much the same way as the prophylac-
tic approach taken by the Supreme Court in Miranda to clarify the
boundaries of proper police conduct.2 64
Another solution involves the aggressive implementation of a com-
munity based, police accountability strategy that would place more po-
lice review in the hands of local citizens. 265 Sometimes known as
"community policing,"266 this strategy would reinforce the notion that
the police work for the community, not the other way around. Placing
more local control in the hands of citizens is also consistent with the
emerging trend toward federalism as a philosophical approach to law
enforcement issues. 267 Nevertheless, whatever merit there may be in
257. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
258. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
259. See id. at 236-37.
260. See generally Ronald Y. L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal Le-
gal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 217 (1988)(reporting 450 cases in which a
state recognized rights that were not available under the federal constitution).
261. The constitutional doctrine should require more structural justification for war-
rantless searches.
262. When search cases are virtually impossible to review, police will have little struc-
tural fear of abusing their discretion.
263. Police work for the citizens, not the other way around.
264. See Kamisar, supra note 220.
265. Citizen review provides vital community input that enables the police to resolve
problems within the department before they get out of hand.
266. See generally JEROME SKOLNICK & DAVID BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE
INNOVATION IN Six AMERICAN CITIES (1986)(providing an overview of community
policing).
267. However, turning to local governments for total control of the quality of law en-
forcement is unwise because "[w]hile combating crime under our system of feder-
alism is primarily a state and local responsibility, there are violations of law that
the federal government is uniquely able to counter." GRIFFIN B. BELL, TAKING
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the supervision of police at the federal level,2 6 8 dishonest and exces-
sive police conduct most directly affects the citizens of the commu-
nity.2 69 This strategy shows particular promise in areas with large
minority populations. Perhaps making law enforcement officials live
in the communities they serve would be a valuable first step in such
efforts. 2 70
Finally, passing local laws that protect and enhance traditional
search and seizure rights is essential to the future of police accounta-
bility.271 Each citizen has a stake in the protection of personal liberty.
Even though crime control is important, most people who have been
unfairly targeted by police or wrongfully or mistakenly detained un-
derstand the value of personal liberty.272 Despite the value of per-
sonal liberty, people rarely succeed in lawsuits against police for
search and seizure violations2 73 because the legal rules in place make
obtaining judgments against individual police officers virtually impos-
sible.2 74 Thus, lawsuits are a poor vehicle for enforcing civil liber-
ties.2 7 5 That is not to say that proper lawsuits against police and
their supervising departments and cities should not be continued.2 76
Such legal actions, however, fall far short of the type of day-to-day
accountability that local legislatures can effectively tailor by
fashioning statutes that require record keeping,2 77 police training on
CARE OF THE LAw 156 (1982)(describing policies in place while serving as Attor-
ney General under President Carter).
268. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1965, 105th Cong. (1997).
269. As Professor Tracey Maclin has insightfully noted:
One need not accept that perjury is a pervasive problem in every police
department to recognize that perjury (or the potential for perjury) may
play a central role in how pretextual traffic stops are carried out. When
narcotics officers and their supervisors admit to stopping as many cars
as possible under the guise of traffic stops to investigate drug trafficking,
the possibilities and temptation to lie about a motorist driving skills are
manifest.
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 V~AD. L. REV. 333, 381
(1998).
270. One of my third year students suggested that the best way to ensure that police
have contact with the community and respect its citizens would be to require
police officers to live in the very community they would regularly patrol.
271. Some federal laws have offered a potential remedy for federal officials' illegal
searches.
272. See ALDERmAN & KENNEDY, supra note 25.
273. See, e.g., NYCLU, supra note 75.
274. Civil immunity insulates individual officers from lawsuits. See Derek W.
Meineche, Note, Assessment of Conduct During High-Speed Chases in State Tort
Liability Cases: The Effects of Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor and Rogers v. City of
Detroit, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 325 (2000) (discussing generally the problems of ob-
taining civil judgments against police officers).
275. Various immunity statutes make lawsuits difficult to sustain.
276. Appropriate lawsuits should still be pursued.
277. Record keeping of search and seizure is a vital accountability tool. One innovative
bill recently proposed in Maryland could require the following:
20001
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(D) Each time a law enforcement officer makes a traffic stop, that officer
shall report the following information to the law enforcement agency
that employs the officer using the form developed under subsection
(B)(1) of this section:
(1) The date, location, and the time of the stop;
(2) The approximate duration of the stop;
(3) The traffic violation or violations alleged to have been commit-
ted that led to the stop;
(4) Whether a search was conducted as a result of the stop;
(5) If a search was conducted, the reason for the search, whether
the search was consensual or nonconsensual, whether the per-
son was searched, and whether the person's property was
searched;
(6) Whether any contraband or other property was seized in the
course of the search;
(7) Whether a warning, safety equipment repair order, or citation
was issued as a result of the stop;
(8) If a warning, safety equipment repair order, or citation was is-
sued, the basis for issuing the warning, safety equipment re-
pair order, or citation;
(9) Whether an arrest was made as a result of either the stop or
the search;
(10) If an arrest was made, the crime charged;
(11) The state in which the stopped vehicle is registered;
(12) The gender of the driver;
(13) The date of birth of the driver;
(14) The state and, if available on the driver's license, the county of
residence of the driver; and






(E) (1) A Law enforcement agency shall:
(I) Compile the data described in subsection (D) of this sec-
tion for the calendar year as a report in the format re-
quired under subsection (B)(3) of this section; and
(II) Submit the report to the Maryland Justice Analysis
Center no later than March 1 of the following calendar
year.
(2) A law enforcement agency that is exempt under subsection
(C)(2) of this section shall submit to the Maryland Justice Anal-
ysis Center copies of reports it submits to the United States De-
partment of Justice in lieu of the report required under
paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(F) (1) The Maryland Justice Analysis Center shall analyze the annual
reports of law enforcement agencies submitted under subsec-
tion (E) of this section based on a methodology developed in con-
sultation with the Police Training Commission.
(2) The Maryland Justice Analysis Center shall submit a report of
the findings to the governor, the general assembly as provided
in § 2-1246 of the state government article, and each law en-
forcement agency before September 1 of each year.
(G) (1) A law enforcement agency shall adopt a policy against race-
based traffic stops that is to be used as a management tool to
promote nondiscriminatory law enforcement and in the train-
ing and counseling of its officers.
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citizen intervention,2 78 and standardized procedures for citizen
(2) The policy shall prohibit the practice of using an individual's
race or ethnicity as the sole justification to initiate a traffic
stop. However, the policy shall make clear that it may not be
construed to alter the authority of a law enforcement officer to
make an arrest, conduct a search or seizure, or otherwise fulfill
the officer's law enforcement obligations.
(3) The policy shall provide for the law enforcement agency to peri-
odically review data collected by its officers under subsection
(D) of this section and to review the annual report of the Mary-
land Justice Analysis Center for purposes of paragraph (1) of
this subsection.
(H) (1) If a law enforcement agency fails to comply with the reporting
provisions of this section, the Maryland Justice Analysis
Center shall report the noncompliance to the Police Training
Commission.
(2) The Police Training Commission shall contact the law enforce-
ment agency and request that the agency comply with the re-
quired reporting provisions.
(3) If the law enforcement agency fails to comply with the required
reporting provisions within 30 days after being contacted by
the Police Training Commission, the Maryland Justice Analy-
sis Center and the Police Training Commission jointly shall re-
port the noncompliance to the governor and the Legislative
Policy Committee of the general assembly.
H.R. 225, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2000).
278. Sensitivity training should be a vital part of police preparation. Some scholars
have criticized sensitivity training as being an unproven technique. Neverthe-
less, better training for men on the force is always recommended. There can be
little doubt that the training now received is sometimes perfunctory. But even
assuming lengthy pre-service training, "human relations" is inevitably the part of
the curriculum that has the least direct effect on the policemen. The procedures
to follow during an arrest or in the application of first aid, and even the proper
use of weapons, can be taught by lecture and demonstration, but the manage-
ment of personal relations in tense situations is not so easily taught.
The officers I interviewed universally testified that training-room discussions
of minority groups and police-community relations have little impact, and that
the impressions they do produce quickly evaporate when the officer goes on the
street and first encounters hostile or suspicious behavior. The officer may re-
member what he is not supposed to do ("don't address blacks with a racially in-
sulting name such as 'boy'"), but he has precious little guidance as to what he
should do when confronted by a serious verbal challenge to his authority.
If conventional training methods are of little value in this area, is it possible
to develop unconventional, more intensive techniques that will effect a more
profound change in the attitude of the officer? Some departments have experi-
mented with "sensitivity training" designed to produce heightened self-aware-
ness and even significant personality changes. Such methods are based on group
discussions, which are stimulated but not directed by a training leader, in which
the participants criticize one another and reexamine themselves in prolonged and
often emotional sessions. Sometimes only police officers participate in such ses-
sions; in other experiments, police and community residents participate together.
One of the chief purposes of sensitivity training is to change the participants'
orientation toward authority and the exercise of authority so that they will en-
gage in cooperative problem solving, rather than struggle to win superiority or
maintain personal autonomy. Unfortunately, the effects of such training (actu-
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questioning.2 79
With respect to police record keeping, I advance a serious caution-
ary note. Any police procedure for recording arrest information that
might detect racial discrimination or other forms of illegal conduct
should be balanced to protect the fair evaluation of street level police
officers. 280 Accordingly, I would confine access to such records to
those involved in internal review processes designed to improve police
performance.281 Such records might ultimately alert police supervi-
sors to a racist or crime prone officer. However, no police discipline
should automatically attend the basic record keeping and review pro-
cess.28 2 Furthermore, such records should not be generally discovera-
ble by defense lawyers28 3 or plaintiffs' lawyers.284 Although these
advocates would still be granted traditional constitutional 28 5 access as
well as access under the procedural discovery rules,28 6 my proposal is
not designed to give wide access to this law enforcement data. It is
primarily a tool for self-enforcement, not for generating time wasting
litigation.287
To prevent unnecessary access to this information, I propose a pro-
cedure in which a special judge or master 28 8 would be appointed to
supervise the disclosure of police arrest records so that material re-
garding the officer's work performance would not be the subject of ran-
dom challenge in every criminal case.2 89 Where the information
generates a legitimate issue of racial discrimination or illegality, how-
ally, reeducation) methods on organizational behavior generally have not been
carefully studied; in particular, the effects on police organization and behavior
have scarcely been studied at all. See JAmEs Q. WILSON, THINKING ABouT CRIME
106 (1983).
279. Some writers have suggested that all police interrogations should be videotaped.
See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. 387, 499 (1996)(citing research that endorses the use of videotape
confessions).
280. Officers should be offered some protection so there is no chilling effect as they do
their job.
281. Many state constitutions have provisions that require their bill of rights to be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the Unites States Constitution. See, e.g.,
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
282. Police supervisors should get the first opportunity to analyze the data and to im-
prove police performance.
283. Due Process may require that the material be available to defense attorneys in
order to preserve the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.
284. Civil law suits may sometimes follow illegal search cases.
285. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
286. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(discussing protective orders).
287. One chief complaint of litigation discovery is that it often wastes valuable court
time and resources.
288. Special masters have been used successfully in many procedural contexts to re-
solve issues confined to specific points of law.
289. The use of an impartial judge to evaluate discovery disputes would be an efficient
way to quickly determine what access to police records would be appropriate.
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ever, access to some of the collected arrest records should be permit-
ted.290 Local legislatures could easily adopt similar procedures that
could be used in civil litigation as well. 29 1
The protection of the arrest records would be designed to reinforce
the idea that police supervisors are the first and best line of accounta-
bility for wayward police performance. 29 2 Moreover, a police depart-
ment would want to be the first to know that it has a "bad apple"2 93 in
its midst. Balance is the key; record-keeping procedures should be
fair and effective for all concerned. 2 94
VII. CONCLUSION
Blaming the Supreme Court exclusively for the lack of clarity in
controls over police conduct during searches and seizures would be un-
fair.2 9 5 Years of waiting on Court decisions to adjust law enforcement
priorities have contributed to layer after layer of uncertainty. The
rhetoric over the war on drugs2 9 6 and philosophical squabbling over
conservative 29 7 or liberal29s approaches to Court rulings like Mi-
290. See supra note 287.
291. Any rule that would limit access to police arrest records in the criminal context
should also be applied to civil discovery.
292. Proper police supervision should involve warning officers who have a record of
complaints and who demonstrate a propensity for improper citizen contact. See
Buus & WHrrNEY, supra note 33, at 218.
293. Some commentators have written about an unwritten code of silence among po-
lice that makes discovering some forms of improper conduct difficult. See gener-
ally Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence"As Evidence of
Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 233
(1998)(discussing the problem of police perjury).
294. Police are generally thought to be underpaid considering the risks inherent in
their job.
295. The absence of meaningful attention to search and seizure laws at the state level
has equally left citizens subject to potentially harmful police discretion.
296. Commentators have noted the following:
The Nixon Administration officially declared the "War on Drugs"
twenty-five years ago. It has continued, at escalating levels, ever since.
Today we annually spend $15 billion in federal funds and $33 billion in
state and local funds to finance this war... however, the Drug War has
been an extraordinary failure. Drugs are more available-at higher pu-
rity and lower prices-than they were at the start of the decade.
Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 35, 36-37 (1998)(footnotes omitted); see also Steven
Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987)(noting that police budgets have become heavily linked
to drug enforcement).
297. Professor Ronald Dworkin insightfully describes the categorization in this way:
Popular imagination sorts justices into camps according to the answers
they are thought to give to questions like these. It deems some justices
"liberal" and others "conservative" and on the whole seems to prefer the
latter. The ground of this distinction, however, is famously elusive, and
one familiar reading has contributed to the lamentable character of the
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randa299 and concepts like the exclusionary rule30O have diverted our
focus from the true issue, which is how we should monitor the day-to-
day conduct of police who possess enormous power and exercise ex-
traordinary discretion over the lives of citizens.3 01
public debate. People say that conservative justices obey the Constitu-
tion while liberal ones try to reform it according to their personal convic-
tions. We know the fallacy in that description. It ignores the
interpretive character of law. Justices who are called liberal and those
who are called conservative agree about which words make up the Con-
stitution as a matter of preinterpretive text. They disagree about what
the Constitution is as a matter of postinterpretive law, about what stan-
dards it deploys for testing official acts. Each kind of justice tries to en-
force the Constitution as law, according to his interpretative judgment of
what it is, and each kind thinks the other is subverting the true Consti-
tution. So it is useless as well as unfair to classify justices according to
the degree of their fidelity to their oath.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 357-58 (1986).
298. The labeling of the different approaches to criminal justice issues as "liberal" or
"conservative" will continue unavoidably because the media and politicians have
grown familiar with these general expressions of ideology. However, those of us
who believe that Chief Justice Warren's opinions, and the decisions of the Courts
he led, on criminal justice issues were at least a step in the right direction point
to the values his opinions were attempting to advance.
Warren's mission... was to suppress behavior that he found obnoxious
or repressive from his perspective of deep commitment to the freedoms
inherent in American citizenship. The Constitution was one source of
Warren's perspective, but there were others: his instincts about what
was fair and just, his humanitarian premises, his outrage at brutal or
immoral acts.
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERIcAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 365 (1976).
299. Any notion that Miranda was not consistent with constitutional values should be
rejected as too narrow a limitation on constitutional power. "All Miranda did was
to conform conduct to the mandates of the Bill of Rights. The most important
function of the court was to give the language of the constitution meaning in the
context of contemporary events, and that it did in Miranda." Id.; see supra note
82 and accompanying text
300. As Professor Lawrence Tribe reminds us:
As Sophocles said, nobody has a more sacred obligation to obey the law
than those who make and enforce it.
This so-called exclusionary rule has often been criticized for valuing
the rights of criminals above those of law-abiding citizens. But those
who wrote the Constitution's limitations on how suspects may be pur-
sued obviously knew that taking those limits seriously - that is, obey-
ing them rather than flouting them - would necessarily prevent some
guilty people from being apprehended and convicted. The exclusionary
rule simply makes that result more dramatic and visible than might
some other rules - rules that successfully prevent illegal searches from
occurring in the first place. But whatever its price, the exclusionary rule
plainly protects the liberties of all of us.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 8 (1985).
301. See Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion: The Institutional Dilemma -
Who Is in Charge?, 68 IOWA L. REV. 431, 437 (1983)("There is little assurance that
policy established by the Supreme Court will be implemented by patrol officers.")
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With grave concerns about police abuse, particularly in the area of
racial discrimination, a legislative consensus to increase the burden of
pro of302 necessary to establish the validity of consent searches303 and
to make police more accountable to their communities by improving
police record keeping, training, and sensitivity will serve the law en-
forcement interests of all citizens. 304 Developing approaches that af-
fect the structural accountability of the search and seizure process is
the only way we can eliminate the uncertainty about the search and
seizure rules that govern our free society.
302. Consistent with the principles of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), "an in-
tentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" should
be jealously protected. Id. at 464. Requiring that the validity of consent searches
that were performed in the absence of a signed consent form be proved by clear
and convincing evidence advances those values.
303. The decision to waive the constitutional right not to consent to a search should be
"voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 421 (1986).
304. "The preservation of freedom requires a positive and continuing commitment.
Specifically the maintenance of the United States as a free society confronts the
American people with an immediate responsibility in two areas in particular:
civil rights and civil liberties." ARTHuR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE ViTAL CENTER:
THE PoLrIcs OF FREEDOM 189 (1949).
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